

One map policy as an anti-corruption endeavour in the Indonesian mining sector

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Abstract: Indonesia plays an important role in the global mining industry, particularly in coal and nickel. Ensuring that mining resources support the people's livelihoods, as mandated by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, requires good governance in the mining sector. However, corruption remains a significant challenge. This research identifies the types of corruption present in the mining sector and proposes solutions. Using qualitative methods and collecting secondary data sources such as news reports and other accessible documents, the study reveals that corruption mostly occurs in the issuance of mining permits, often due to overlapping areas between mining permits and other land uses. In order to address these issues and strengthen governance, the One Map Policy has been proposed. This policy aims to improve spatial planning quality, reduce overlaps between mining concessions and Indigenous peoples' areas, and prevent concessions in protected forests. However, the policy faces challenges due to a lack of transparency in making map data publicly accessible, which hinders external inputs. Additionally, there is no government body responsible for verifying independent map data from external sources. Enhancing transparency and involving external parties in providing input to the One Map Policy can promote accountability, ensuring mining activities adhere to good governance principles and protect local communities and Indigenous peoples' rights as well as their livelihoods.

Keywords: One Map Policy, Corruption, Mining Sector, Mining Permits, Mining Governance

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Introduction

Kinship plays a pivotal role as the economic foundation of the nation, as stipulated in Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This constitutional mandate underscores the profound impact of kinship on the economy of the country, necessitating state control over sectors of high economic value to ensure equitable and just distribution and utilization of resources. Among these resources, various types of mines stand out as particularly lucrative sectors, holding the potential to significantly enhance social welfare.

Given the substantial economic benefits derived from mining sectors, it is imperative for the state to maintain regulatory oversight to prevent exploitation and ensure that the wealth generated contributes to the collective well-being of people. This is crucial where Indonesia has established itself as a major global player in coal and nickel commodities (Ordenez et al., 2021; Siahaan, 2024). Thus, to ensure that mining resources can support the livelihoods of many people, the mining sector must be well-governed as outlined in the constitution.

The Former Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, amplified the statement of the former Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* or KPK) Chairman Abraham Samad in 2013 in which he said if corruption in the mining sector could be eliminated, then every person in Indonesia could have an income of IDR 30 million per month (CNN Indonesia, 2022). Corrupt practices can also be seen as a failure of democratic states to adequately uphold the ideals they promise on social welfare (Sullivan, 2002). This is because corruption will hamper the distribution of welfare access for the public.

Apart from that, studies conducted by various institutions emphasize the possibility of huge state losses in the mining sector. For example, even though only 4 cases of corruption were

recorded in the mining sector throughout 2019, the mining sector still caused state losses estimated at IDR 5.9 trillion, as reported by the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) (Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2020). These losses underscore the sector's vulnerability to corruption and the effect on its tax revenue, which only has a ratio of 6.3%, far from the ideal ratio of 14-16% (W. Saputra, 2013). Furthermore, according to research by KPK, the potential state revenue from mining industry, especially Non-Tax State Revenue (*Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak* or PNBP), still falls short of its highest level due to several issues such as arrears in PNBP payments, unlawful levies, and invalid calculations of coal and mineral content values (Capri et al., 2021).

In addition, current tax and PNBP rates in the mining sector remain insufficient. For example, the Property Tax (PBB) rate for mineral and coal mining is only around IDR 81,000 per hectare (W. Saputra, 2018). The low tax and PNBP rates lead to the state revenue generated from the mining sector remaining insufficient to fund necessary welfare programs for society. This underfunding is further compounded by rampant corruption practices, which divert funds that could otherwise support public goods and services.

These corruption characteristics occur in the mining sectors where most corruption factors are related to permits that intertwine with land-use governance. Therefore, strengthening land-use governance is essential to effectively combat corruption within the mining industry. One of the potential solutions for improving land-use governance is the One Map Policy, which the Indonesian government established through Presidential Regulation Number 9/2016 regarding the Acceleration of Implementation of the One Map Policy at a Map Accuracy Level of 1:50,000 Scale. This policy seeks to standardize and synchronize spatial data to improve transparency, reduce overlaps in land permits, and enhance legal certainty for stakeholders. Despite the potential benefits of the One Map Policy, there are several challenges that could impede its effectiveness in reforming land-use governance and reducing corruption in the mining sector

This article aims to explore the typology of corruption in the mining sector and examine the One Map Policy as a potential solution to mitigate these issues. It will specifically focus on the participatory challenges encountered during the policy's implementation, along with potential solutions to ensure the One Map Policy remains on track to meet good governance goals.

Methods

This study employs desk study as a qualitative approach to explore the analysis of corruption and mining governance as well as the potential of the One Map Policy to strengthen mining governance (Suryabrata, 2019). By collecting data from secondary sources, including news articles, regulations, academic articles, and NGO reports, this study aims to paint a comprehensive picture of the corruption landscape in the mining industry. The choice of this method is intentional, allowing for a nuanced understanding of the complex and often hidden mechanisms of corruption that quantitative data might miss. Furthermore, the potential of the One Map Policy to curb corruption in mining governance will be rigorously analyzed through an extensive review of existing studies and literature.

Results and Discussion

Corruption in the Mining Sector

If we conduct a literature review on the typology of corrupt practices in the mining sector, at least three types of corruption in the Indonesian mining sector can be ascertained. *First*, 'state-captured corruption' in the natural resources sector. The practice of corruption in this sector in Indonesia is still deeply rooted in the intertwined problem of the practice of state-captured corruption with the weak function of state institutional authority (Agustyati et al., 2022).

The corrupt practices in the mineral and coal mining sectors begin when a regulation is drafted that deviates from legal norms and does not correspond with formal material principles or address corruption within the legislation (Sulaiman, 2023). Corruption can occur in the form of "Administrative Corruption," which is an underpinning act of corrupt behavior committed on a systematic, legal-formal, and deliberate basis. The purpose is to prevent or take advantage of material flaws in legislation with a specific vested interest. It can also be "State Capture" in the

form of "affirmative action" for a given individual, group, or company to be able to grant permits, overlook violations, or favor certain companies based on oligarchic profits.

The ambiguity of the law preserves corruption practices within the sector. The mining regulation is quite scattered in legal governance because it is governed across sectors of the environment, mining, forestry, agrarian and spatial planning, as well as subnational regulations (Nasir et al., 2022). Furthermore, the power dynamic within the sector means that the unseen activities regarding the issuance of mining permits tend to be corrupt due to vague implementation. Patronage networks will be satisfied with this practice because they can continue gaining advantages toward the political and business elite (Warburton, 2018). The lack of regulatory clarity and inconsistent law enforcement gives significant discretion to officials in the mining sector. This discretionary power can lead to arbitrary decision-making, where officials may grant permits, overlook violations, or favor certain companies based on personal gain.

For instance, a safeguard for corruption eradication in the environmental sector, namely the Environmental Impact Assessment (or AMDAL), is insufficient to ensure that local people do not suffer negative consequences as a result of mining projects because it lacks a participatory component. The degree of community participation in the AMDAL process has decreased significantly after the enactment of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (Pambudhi & Ramadayanti, 2021). Environmental advocates and civil society organizations are not defined as affected communities by a given project, and they are not involved in the AMDAL process according to the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. Environmental advocates, however, play an important role in assisting local people in mining projects. A lack of community involvement is a sign of potentially corrupt practices, which would hinder people from attaining benefits to their prosperity.

Second, the variations of patronage and clientelism that occur in the mining sector. This type mostly occurs in the issuance of mining permits. This patronage and clientelism can be seen in any political system. Borrowing Edward Aspinall's term, patronage is defined as "the distribution of material resources for specific purposes and providing political benefits, and specifically, material resources distributed through clientelistic networks based on personal power relationships" (Aspinall, 2013). The phenomena of patronage and clientelism are very common in the run-up to and after local elections. It is a fact that the political cost of joining the regional elections is huge, making the candidates seek 'investors' to fund their candidacy. If the regional head candidate is elected, they will provide the donor with easy business permits (Risal et al., 2022). According to KPK and the National Research and Innovation Agency, the regent or mayoral candidates need at least 20-30 billion IDR to fund their candidacy in the regional elections, while the candidates for governor need 100 billion IDR to be electorally competitive (Ni'am & Asril, 2022).

Meanwhile, the study from Azizah (2022) found that corrupt practices in the mining sector occurred from the stage of determining mining areas (WP) and determining mining business permits areas (WIUP) to issuing IUPs and Exploration IUPs. The corruption gap in the mining sector occurs, among other things, because of weak audit and supervision systems in matters of mining activities. Apart from that, according to Azizah (2022), overlapping processes for granting IUPs which involve several institutions often give rise to corruption cases in the mining sector. Furthermore, this cannot be separated from several factors, such as the absence of spatial planning maps or maps of mining areas, non-uniform manual mapping systems, and manual map database systems.

Jaringan Advokasi Tambang (Jatam) noted that there were at least 170 new permits issued in that political year (Jaringan Advokasi Tambang, 2018). The widespread issuance of permits in the mining sector due to transactions between candidates and donors reveals the ease of granting permits to donors after the candidate wins the election. This observation is strengthened by research from the KPK in 2015, which stated that out of around 286 candidates who failed in the Regional Head Election, 161 regional head candidates admitted that the donors who financed their contest hoped for a reward in the future (Dalilah et al., 2019).

In this scheme, political actors wielding authority can exploit their power to distribute resources, such as mining permits, to favored groups based on personal and subjective relationships. Rather than adhering to principles of accountability or abiding by established legal

frameworks, these actors make decisions influenced by personal connections and favoritism due to the patron-client relationship.

Third, the form of bureaucratic and administrative corruption also occurs in the mining sector. Bureaucratic corruption is exacerbated by weak state administrative capacity, low salaries of civil servants, and lack of oversight (Martini, 2012). This type of corruption is widespread because of the overlap between mining permits and other designated areas, causing the mining concession area to not be clean and clear and thereby indicating weakness of the state in its administrative capacity. A study from the KPK in 2014 showed that mining concessions based on Contracts of Work (*Kontrak Karya* or KK) and Coal Mining Concession Work Agreements (*Perjanjian Karya Pengusahaan Pertambangan Batubara* or PKP2B) overlapped with conservation forest areas covering an area of 1.3 million hectares and with protected forest areas covering an area of 4.9 million hectares (Cahyono et al., 2020). Apart from that, overlapping mining permits also occur with palm oil plantation permits/Business Use Rights (HGU), which cover an area of 3 million hectares (Cahyono et al., 2020).

The Indonesian mapping system, which does not yet cover all of Indonesia's territory in detail, makes it difficult to determine boundaries, which in fact is crucial to ensure that there are no overlapping mining concessions (Eng, 2016). Thus, this makes it difficult for the central government to supervise regional governments in terms of permit-granting mechanisms, consequently opening the door to corrupt practices in the regions. One of the biggest examples of corrupt practices occurring in the region is the case of East Kotawaringin Regent Supian Hadi, who caused state losses reaching IDR 5.8 trillion or 711,000 US dollars. Supian abused his authority to issue mining permits to three companies during the period between 2010 and 2012 (Dzulfaroh & Hardiyanto, 2023)

Moreover, research from Transparency International Indonesia shows that of the 35 corruption risks found in the process of obtaining exploration IUP permits, some of the most serious corruption risks are related to permit design and mining area designation (Macdonald, 2017). Thus, this strengthens the indication that the mining sector tends to be more vulnerable to political corruption rather than bureaucratic corruption (Greenpeace et al., 2018). This corruption risk is exacerbated by the non-disclosure of data regarding beneficial ownership of related companies, thereby hampering the law enforcement process when the true owner of the company is not clearly identified.

Although the specific forms of corruption in the mining sector may vary, they share common underlying issues: permit issuance and a lack of transparency and accountability. These factors collectively drive corrupt practices within mining sector. The one map policy, established through Presidential Regulation Number 9 of 2016, offers a potential solution by integrating spatial data from multiple ministries, agencies, and local governments to create accurate, cohesive thematic maps. This integrated mapping system can help address corruption risks by improving land governance—particularly by reducing overlapping mining permits, enhancing central government oversight of local authorities, and providing early indications of corrupt activities through indicative maps.

The One Map Policy as the Solution

According to Borzel and Risse (2010) regarding the governance paradigm, the phenomenon of the government's absence in delivering services is the practice of limited statehood, in which the government has limited capacity to implement and bind certain regulations. This paradigm leads to a lack of performance in meeting societal needs, making the strengthening of government competency a prerequisite for solving this issue. As a result, the Indonesian government has begun to increase its capacity to improve land governance by enacting the One Map Policy through Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 9/2016 on Acceleration of Implementation of the One Map Policy at a Map Accuracy Level of 1:50,000 Scale. We perceive that the implementation of the One Map Policy could serve to mitigate the potential for corruption within the mining sector, particularly in light of the primary corruption practice in the mining sector in Indonesia, namely the issuance of permits, which have been identified as a significant mechanism for corruption and lack of transparency and accountability.

One Map Policy works by compiling data on all permits and supporting documents such as permit decrees and permit maps in shapefile format in order to solve the spatial data challenges. Afterward, the data that has been compiled is integrated with the same basic map of the earth until being synchronized at the final stage. At this stage, an Indicative Permit Overlap Map is produced so that it is visible which mining concessions need to formulate a mechanism for resolving overlaps, as well as initial identification of corruption indicators in certain mining concessions. As of April 2024, the compilation process from all government institutions' thematic maps is completed, while the integration and synchronization processes are 90% and 86% completed respectively. Moreover, as of July 2024, the One Map Policy can be accessed by 42 ministries/state institutions, 35 provincial governments, and 467 city/regency governments (B. Saputra, 2024).




Figure 1. One Map Policy Phase. (Source: Processed by the Author)

The problem of overlapping land claims has long been present in the mining sector. A study conducted by the KPK in 2010 found overlapping land in mining business licenses in forest areas with potential losses reaching 15.9 trillion in Kalimantan (Yusmur et al., 2024). Land overlaps occur because there is no clear verification mechanism between licensors and between licensing sectors, and there is no uniform map as a reference. This has led to overlaps, for example, between HGU and IUP. One Map Policy is a clear solution to overcome overlapping spatial utilization which must be encouraged in order to solve the problem. Differences in map formats used by stakeholders often trigger conflicts, land disputes, and development that is not in accordance with mining spatial planning, so the One Map Policy can be a solution to address this issue.

The implementation of the One Map Policy can facilitate the transparency and accountability agenda of economic activities in the mining sector. It is evident that the mining sector is susceptible to corruption due to the lack of sufficient public or governmental monitoring of IUP holders and other obligations. This is inextricably linked to the dearth of capacity and technical institutions, such as the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources or the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Macdonald, 2017b). The implementation of the One Map Policy will facilitate the monitoring of areas that have been issued IUP's and those areas that have not been included in any permits. This is inseparable from the characteristics of the One Map Policy, which encompasses the identification of the potential and actual location of natural resources within each Indonesian Region. Additionally, the One Map Policy encompasses the types of natural resources present and their respective management status (KESDM RI, 2016).

Furthermore, the One Map Policy also has the potential to expedite the process of effective spatial planning, which is a fundamental requirement for the enhancement of governance quality within the Indonesian mining sector. Moreover, business actors are held to a higher standard of accountability. They are able to operate with greater legal certainty, which allows them to avoid agrarian conflicts with local or Indigenous communities. Such conflicts have the potential to cause significant operational losses for companies if they cannot be avoided. Those local communities and Indigenous peoples who are particularly vulnerable in the context of land tenure also receive enhanced protection through comprehensive spatial planning.

Challenges in Implementing One Map Policy

There are several challenges in implementing the One Map Policy to reduce opportunities for corruption. *Primarily*, the transparency of opening concession data is the biggest challenge faced in implementing the One Map Policy. Indonesia, which is one of the countries that signed the Open

Government Partnership declaration, still has challenges in this regard because it considers concession data to be private property that cannot be open to the public. The government's interpretation of concession data classification differs from existing regulations. As regulated in Law Number 14/2008 on Openness of Public Information, everyone has the right to obtain information regarding public policy planning, government programs, and decision-making processes that affect the lives of many people. On this matter, every citizen can demand the state provide information regarding land concessions in order to become a vehicle for monitoring the risks of corruption in the land sector. For instance, civil society organizations in the context of palm oil governance have sued for the disclosure of the right to cultivate (HGU) data to the Public Information Commission (*Komisi Informasi Publik* or KIP), and the lawsuit prevailed (Arumingtyas, 2019). Likewise, the East Jakarta State Administrative Court (PTUN) decided in favour of the lawsuit requiring the disclosure of HGU data (Arumingtyas, 2019). Unfortunately, the government's intention to improve the transparency of concession data is still absent even though it has been encouraged by permanent legal decrees.

Secondly, there is no community involvement in data synchronization. In terms of regulations, the One Map Policy still does not provide broad access to the public. As regulated in Presidential Decree Number 20/2018 on Access Authority to Share Geospatial Data and Information Through the National Geospatial Information Network in Activities to Accelerate the Implementation of the One Map Policy, only a few parties can access the National Geospatial Information Network such as the President, Vice President, Coordinating Minister for Sector Economy, Head of Bappenas, Head of Geospatial Information Agency, Minister or Head of Institution, Governor, and Regent/Mayor.

The lack of community involvement in the development of the One Map Policy can be an indication of the decline and stagnation of democracy in Indonesia. Based on the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (2023), Indonesia's democracy, which is categorized as a 'flawed democratic country', faces a serious challenge due to its declining democratic performance. This condition is inseparable from the low level of public participation in the state. Without *comparable* data from citizens, all data produced by ministries or other government institutions only synchronize between them, potentially impeding the efforts of agrarian reform. Meanwhile, external parties like Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif (JKPP) have consolidated 14.5 million hectares of land data, and about 7.8 million hectares of customary land have been registered by Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat (BRWA) (Hanavi, 2020). Moreover, according to the Decree of the Head of Geospatial Information Agency Number 28/2019 on the Thematic Geospatial Information Working Group, the name of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (AMAN) as Indigenous peoples' representative is no longer included in that working group despite the fact that one of the goals of the One Map policy is to minimize and tackle agrarian conflicts. It is difficult to address agrarian conflicts when citizens' spatial data are not accommodated as one of the references in integration and synchronization processes.

As in Silviana's findings (2019), the One Map policy must still be reviewed due to the land ownership disputes between parties. These disputes cannot be resolved if the process of compiling and synchronizing only involves ministries/government institutions. The situation is exacerbated because there are no government institutions that undertake verification on the independent maps received from external parties, so the ability of broader society to give spatial inputs to be included in the One Map Policy is reduced (Shahab, 2016). For instance, it may affect the Indigenous Peoples' area recognition, which is around 40 million hectares, due to the lack of a data custodian for the customary maps (Shahab, 2016).

Besides JKPP and BRWA, Greenpeace Indonesia also faces difficulties in supporting the One Map Policy due to a lack of transparency of the One Map Policy to civil society organizations (CSOs), which hinders them from monitoring and providing inputs to the government (Nurhidayah, 2022). Greenpeace Indonesia owns an independent interactive map called the "*Kepo Hutan*" map. The platform is perceived as a conflict source because Greenpeace Indonesia does not have the authority to publish and report unofficial map data to the public. On the other hand, the platform can enhance the accuracy of the One Map Policy if this policy is opened to obtain inputs from any parties.

Lastly, the lack of quantity and quality of human resources in the geospatial field. Reflecting the evaluation of the policy during 2016 to 2019 period, the lack of quantity and quality of human resources to implement the One Map Policy affected the policy's progression. Only around 25% of institutions (both national and subnational government) that are involved with this policy have an adequate workforce specialized in geospatial data, and those agencies do not have a specific division that undertakes the One Map Policy implementation in particular (Abidin & Wijanarto, 2021). An adequate amount of human resources with reliable geospatial expertise are needed to accelerate the implementation of the One Map Policy.

At the 2019 National Coordination Meeting on Geospatial Information, the former head of the Geospatial Information Agency (BIG) Hasanudin Zaindal Abidin, in front of the former Minister of National Development Planning Bambang Brodjonegoro, said that there is a workforce deficit of 20.000 people to meet the need of thematic and national mapping in Indonesia. He also assessed that in the future, the need for detailed mapping on a larger scale will be important for the purposes of agrarian reform, spatial planning, disaster-prone maps, exclusive economic zones, and industrial areas (Herlinawati, 2019). It is important to underline that the successful implementation of the One Map Policy depends on the availability of competent and reliable human resources. Addressing the challenge of providing adequate human resources and establishing effective geospatial implementation units at the national and subnational government levels is critical, especially with Indonesia's vast territory and diverse geospatial infrastructure.

Participatory and Inclusive Mining Governance Through One Map Implementation

Corruption in the mining sector is an enemy that must be eradicated so that mining practices can generate income for the welfare of society. One of the essential aspects that must be implemented in mining governance in Indonesia is consistency across the mining industry. A holistic and integrated governance framework for the extractive industry must cover the entire value chain of the extractive sector, starting from mineral area licensing, geological mapping, mineral exploration, mine development, mining, mineral processing, refining, transportation, and manufacturing up to these of final products, recycling, and mine closure (Ayuk et al., 2020).

In research conducted by Transparency International Indonesia (2017), corruption in the mining sector generally occurs most often during the process of determining mining areas. This stage is often suspected of weak supervision and control of processes, especially in the areas of vertical and horizontal coordination between government agencies, geological information systems, and *public* access to regional information. In the permit granting system, information regarding the geological value of mining zones or conversion criteria and processes is complex for the public to access (Macdonald, 2017a). Limited access to information in the mining permit granting system actually creates opportunities for corrupt practices because public supervision and accountability of government officials are lost.

Mining governance must be implemented with participatory and inclusive principles by providing *equal* governance space between every stakeholder involved. Community involvement in the governance of the mining sector is one way to support this one-map standard. Several studies also show the positive impact of community involvement in preventing corrupt practices. Studies conducted by Pradiptyo (2020) found that the KPK's National Movement to Save Natural Resources (GNP SDA) Program, which aims to improve aspects of governance in the mining sector, has succeeded in having a positive impact on the governance of the natural resources sector. The KPK's GNP SDA collaboration is implemented in the form of: (1) Becoming a reference source of data and information and an informant/resource person for developing recommendations; (2) Connecting with communities related to the object of improvement; (3) Providing an alternative source of information other than the relevant ministry/institution or local government,

The involvement of civil society is pivotal in the efforts to prevent and eradicate corruption, particularly in the mining sector. Civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) serve as watchdogs, holding both the government and private entities accountable for their actions. Their active participation in monitoring and reporting can significantly enhance the transparency and effectiveness of policies aimed at curbing *corruption*. In the context of implementing the One Map Policy, the involvement of civil society can be instrumental. By

providing a platform for community engagement and oversight, this policy can leverage the insights and vigilance of local populations to ensure that mining activities adhere to legal and ethical standards.

The potential for community involvement in the supervision of the One Map Policy is profound. Empowering local communities to monitor and report on land use and mining activities can help detect *and* deter corrupt practices early on. Moreover, community involvement ensures that the policy reflects the needs and concerns of those most affected by mining operations, thereby fostering greater legitimacy and compliance. According to Transparency International, the participation of civil society is crucial in creating a comprehensive approach to corruption prevention, as it complements governmental efforts by bringing in diverse perspectives and fostering a culture of accountability (Maslen, 2024).

In the mining sector, the presence of active civil society groups can lead to more sustainable and equitable outcomes. For instance, in Peru, the involvement of civil society in monitoring mining activities has led to significant improvements in environmental governance and community rights (Bebbington et al., 2018). By advocating for transparency and accountability, civil society organizations have helped to mitigate the adverse effects of mining on local communities and the environment. This example underscores the potential benefits of civil society involvement in implementing the One Map Policy in Indonesia.

Conclusion

Based on the above analysis, there are several conclusions that can be drawn from this research. *First*, cases of corruption in mining sector governance take three forms: state-captured corruption, the variations of patronage and clientelism, and forms of bureaucratic and administrative corruption. State-captured corruption is fuelled by oligarchic control over state institutions, which enables the unauthorized issuance of mining concessions. Patronage and clientelism thrive during election cycles, where political figures exchange mining licenses for campaign donations, while bureaucratic corruption is compounded by administrative inefficiencies, weak oversight, and overlapping licenses that further complicate land governance. Moreover, the three types of corruption share similarities in terms of weak capacity of state institutions, permit issuance or regulatory ambiguity as the primary mechanism of corruption, and ineffective oversight systems.

Second, this research perceives that the One Map Policy has emerged as a potential solution to improve land governance and mitigate the risk of corruption in the mining sector. Furthermore, the implementation of these policies has encountered several challenges, including the difficulty in accessing the wider community, the absence of comparisons, and the dearth of human resources with the requisite technical capabilities to develop these policies.

Third, corruption, particularly in the allocation of mining areas, was highlighted as a significant problem due to weak oversight and limited public access to information. To overcome this, participatory and inclusive governance principles are needed, where all stakeholders have equal involvement. As found in the argument for participation in the One Map Policy, the involvement of civil society through public oversight functions and increased accountability of decision-makers and government officials in the implementation of the policy is considered to have a positive impact on governance in the mining sector. It is essential to ensure the public has adequate information access regarding the One Map Policy, allowing citizens to be involved and informed in the spatial governance. Once the public has adequate information access, then the government should allow input from external parties which can enrich and elaborate the map data comprehensively in order to prevent agrarian conflicts.

To support this policy, we propose a series of policy recommendations for the government or any stakeholders to consider in order to more effectively implement the One Map Policy, particularly in its capacity as a tool for reducing corruption in the mining sector. Primarily, participatory mechanisms in the One Map Policy are necessary to accommodate external map inputs from parties outside the government. Thus, civil society groups should be added to the working group of One Map Policy Implementation by revising the Head of Geospatial Information Agency Decree

Number 28/2019 and enacting a new decree that mandates them as members of the working group. This is essential to ensure that the synchronization process is undertaken comprehensively and prevent differences in data between the government and communities.

Next, we perceive that corruption eradication efforts are only doable if joint efforts to improve governance can be undertaken. Involving external parties in the working group of the One Map Policy is a practical step to accommodate these efforts in the mining sector. This can create a system where corruption risks—foremost in the issuance of mining permits which allegedly arise due to overlapping permits and unclear land governance—can be identified and addressed from multiple stakeholders' angles.

Since the improvement of land governance quality is the determinant factor in eradicating corruption cases in the mining sector, other efforts should be undertaken to support this action, such as strengthening government capacity in geospatial analysis and adding dedicated human resources with geospatial analysis specialization in each institution, increasing transparency and accountability in land governance, empowering civil society involvement, and, most importantly, encouraging government agencies that have the authority to issue land permits to collaborate in developing the One Map Policy with external parties.

Moreover, it is imperative that the government implement a comprehensive policy, from the national to the regional levels, to cultivate a robust and reliable human resources base in the fields of geography and geodesy. This will facilitate the expeditious implementation of the One Map Policy. The government can also collaborate with vocational schools to conduct training and workshops, thereby developing a skilled workforce.

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