

Correlation between the handling of corruption cases and public complaints to the KPK

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Abstract: Eradication of corruption in Indonesia requires public participation to be more effective and efficient. One aspect of community involvement when eradicating corruption is the reporting of suspected corruption crimes to law enforcers, including the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK). Public complaints are very important for the KPK when investigating corruption cases. Therefore, knowing which factors are correlated with the community's intention to report is important. To accommodate public complaints, the KPK has established a whistle-blower system. This study aims to determine the correlation between the handling of corruption by the Corruption Eradication Commission and the number of public complaints to the Corruption Eradication Commission pertaining to corruption crimes at the City and Regency levels throughout Indonesia. Case handling is proxied by the number of cases being investigated by the KPK compared to the number of complaints received by them. By using the panel system dynamic regression model GMM, the results of the study found that the ratio of handling cases of lag 1, the average democracy index, education level and the number of complaints of lag 1 were correlated significantly with the number of public complaints, while the lag 1 corruption ratio variable is not significantly correlated with public complaints.

Keywords: Complaints; Case Handling; Whistle-blower triangle.

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Introduction

The fight against corruption in Indonesia is far from over. More and more corruption cases are being uncovered, with more diverse and complex modus operandi. According to statistical data on prosecutions handled by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), corruption cases at the local government level in the 2010-2013 period numbered 63, which increased to 92 cases in the 2014-2016 period. During the 2017-2019 period, corruption cases in the regions increased dramatically to 288 cases. The number of local government heads who were involved in corruption crimes also increased, from 16 regional heads in the 2010-2013 period, to 32 in 2014-2016, to 65 in the 2017-2019 period, a significant increase (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 2022). The massive amount of corruption behaviour as described above indicates that relying on law enforcers including the Police, the Prosecutor's Office and the KPK to eradicate corruption crimes is insufficient. The eradication of corruption in Indonesia clearly needs participation from the community.

Complaints and reports are a tangible form of community participation in the context of eradicating corruption in Indonesia. In the context of the KPK, public complaints related to allegations of corruption are very important. The community are stakeholders who directly feel the results of policy and supervise the administration of the state, both at the central and local government levels. They can provide more accurate information on any deviations. The red-handed operation (OTT) that is often carried out by the KPK has proven the effectiveness of public complaints submitted to the KPK.

Public complaints to the KPK regarding allegations of corruption can be understood as a whistleblowing act. Miceli dan Near (1985) define a whistle-blower as "a member of an organisa-

tion who discloses illegal, immoral or unlawful practices under the control of their superior to a person or organisation who may be able to take action". Every individual, as a member of the community who knows a deviation, can report it to the relevant authority so that action can be taken against the perpetrators.

In order to encourage the public to raise their complaints about alleged corruption, the KPK has created a system called KWS, aka the KPK Whistle-blower System. This system was created to facilitate the lodging of complaints about alleged corruption safely and quickly. The confidentiality and security of the reporter is guaranteed by the KPK, so that the reporter does not need to fear that their identity will be exposed to the reported party. Ease of reporting through KWS is expected to increase the number of public complaints regarding instances of corruption.

Several studies related to the factors that drive whistleblowing intentions have been carried out. Taylor dan Curtis (2013) found in their research that organisational commitment is positively correlated with reporting intentions. Organisational commitment is interpreted as the seriousness of an organisation when handling fraud reports from whistle-blowers. The higher the organisational commitment, the greater the intent of a person to report, and vice versa. The reporter views the seriousness of the organisation in taking action against breaches that occur as an incentive to carry out other reporting.

The characteristics of the violation (seriousness of wrongdoing) were also found to have a significant relationship with reporting behaviour. The more serious the violation, the greater the intent of the reporter to carry out whistleblowing, and vice versa (Hersh, 2002; Near & Miceli, 1995; Somers & Casal, 2011).

In addition to the aforementioned factors, there are also educational factors as found by Vadera et al. (2009) that affect the reporting behaviour. The higher a person's education level, the more likely they are to report violations they know.

Based on the previous research, the problem to be addressed through this research relates to the level of correlation between the handling of corruption cases by the Corruption Eradication Commission and the number of public complaints related to corruption crimes received by the KPK in Cities/Regencies throughout Indonesia.

Public Complaints

Public complaints are enshrined in the principles of public service. Public complaints occur when the public, as service users, are not satisfied with the services they receive. Public service standards that have been set do not guarantee quality. Therefore, it is important to manage complaints properly and effectively in an effort to open as much access as possible to the public so that they can participate in improving the quality of public services (Ombudsman Republik Indonesia, 2020).

The government has issued a regulation related to the procedure for complaints against alleged corruption, namely the Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 71 of 2000 on the Procedures for Implementing Community Participation and Awarding in the Prevention and Eradication of Corruption (2000). This regulation also provides incentives to the public who participate in the prevention and eradication of corruption. In 2018, Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 43 of 2018 concerning Procedures for Implementing Community Participation and Awarding in Preventing and Eradicating Corruption (2018) was issued, revising Government Regulation 71 of 2000. Through this regulation, it is hoped that public participation in preventing and eradicating corruption will increase.

In the context of the KPK, public complaints related to alleged criminal acts of corruption are very important. In uncovering a corruption case, the KPK requires information from the public as stakeholders who directly supervise the public administration process, both at the central and local government levels. The better the quality of information received by the KPK from the public regarding allegations of corruption, the greater the chance that the alleged corruption will be revealed. Most corruption cases that have been uncovered by the KPK come from public complaints, especially those in red-handed operations (OTT).

Whistle-blower Triangle

The term whistle-blower or whistleblowing was first defined by an advocate from the United States, Ralph Nader. Nader defined whistleblowing as “an act of a man or woman who, believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the organisation he/she serves, blows the whistle that the organisation is [engaged] in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or harmful activity” (Devitt, 2015). Terminologically, whistleblowing is defined as a form of disclosure or reporting of fraudulent acts committed by public officials or members of an organisation. Whistleblowing is considered an act of 'truth-telling', with the whistle-blower seen as someone who 'speaks the truth to the authorities'. Someone who reports corruption crime is often described as a whistle-blower. However, a whistle-blower is not only limited to the disclosure of corruption acts, but also various other violations, including waste of public resources, gross negligence, risks to public health and safety, environmental damage or covering up such acts (Devitt, 2015).

Whistleblowing is the most effective way to stop corruption. Many cases of corruption and fraud have been exposed by workers reporting fraud to employers, regulators, or the press. This is because workers are within the organisation's own environment, so they can clearly see, study and report any fraud. It is believed that more cases of workplace fraud are uncovered by whistle-blowers than by other means (National Whistleblower Center, 2019).




Figure 1. Whistle-blower Triangle Concept

Cressey (1973) proposed a model that is able to explain fraudulent practices within organisations, known as The Fraud Triangle. The Fraud Triangle component was later adapted into the Whistle-blower Triangle (Smaili & Arroyo, 2019). As described above, a person's desire to report fraud (whistleblowing intention) is influenced by three factors: pressure/incentive, opportunity and rationalisation.

Pressure covers a number of feelings, both positive and negative. Latan et al. (2019) defines pressure as a feeling of being threatened in the future, which can interfere with the complainant's motivation to file a complaint against fraudulent acts. Psychological pressure in the form of loss of reputation and the potential for injustice that may be experienced can encourage whistle-blowers to choose silence and refrain from telling the truth. Other pressures identified were: (1) risk of being fired, (2) the risk of unfair treatment, (3) fear of future retaliation and (4) risk of losing reputation (Latan et al., 2021). On the other hand, organisational commitment in responding to reports can be an incentive for someone to want to report violations. Organisations that are responsive to reports of violations create optimism for whistle-blowers that reports of violations will be followed up properly (Taylor & Curtis, 2013).

Opportunity is a resource available for the reporter to do whistleblowing. Internal resources come in the form of procedures, codes of ethics and corporate governance mechanisms within an organisation or company. External resources are legal protections, compensation and the presence or absence of retaliation.

Rationalisation is the process of justification within the reporter when they choose to take action or not, according to their moral standards when facing ethical problems (Brown et al., 2016; Dellaportas, 2013; Lokanan, 2015; Murphy & Dacin, 2011). Rationalisation is also defined as the

cognitive justification process behind the whistle-blower's decision to report or complain about fraud (Smaili & Arroyo, 2019; Tsang, 2002).

Individual, Situational and Organisational Factors

The mindset of the wheel of whistleblowing shows that there are several factors that influence the complaint/reporting process and the reporter themselves, namely individual factors, situation, and organisation. At the individual level, the scope of factors influencing reporting is very wide and the findings are often inconsistent (Vadera et al., 2009). The study of Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran (2005) shows that the role of demographic characteristics in predicting reporting does not have a direct effect. A Dalton and Radtke (2013) study found that women have stronger reporting intentions than men. Kaplan et al. (2009) found that gender significantly affects the intention to report through anonymous channels but not non-anonymous channels. A more consistent finding is that reporting behaviour is influenced by education and salary (Near & Miceli, 1995; Vadera et al., 2009). Bjørkelo et al. (2010) found that individuals with low levels of agreeableness and high levels of extroversion and dominance were more likely to report. Alford (2001) considers narcissism as a strong driver of the intention to report. Finally, empathy also affects the likelihood of reporting (Singer et al., 1998).

Situational factors reflect the context and characteristics of the deceptive action observed by observers (Cassebatis & Wortley, 2013). Compared to individual factors, situational factors have greater strength and consistency in explaining complaints or reporting fraud (Cassebatis & Wortley, 2013; Vadera et al., 2009). We can classify situational factors into two categories, namely organisational characteristics and violation characteristics (Near & Miceli, 1995). Reports of fraud or corruption are more common in larger companies and those having trade unions (Barnett, 1992). In addition, a strong ethical environment in the organisation will increase reporting intentions (Dalton & Radtke, 2013). The characteristics of violations in general have a significant relationship with reporting behaviour (Near & Miceli, 1995). The decision to report depends on the seriousness of the problem (Hersh, 2002; Somers & Casal, 2011).

Organisational factors are the legal environment in a society, state and nation. These factors are broader in scope than situational factors. The legal environment can be understood as a legal instrument used to protect whistle-blowers when reporting a breach. The most obvious purpose of legal instruments is to protect the complainant from retaliation by the reported party or others (Vandekerckhove, 2016). The implementation of laws that protect whistle-blowers has a major influence on how they will be handled and protected (Miceli et al., 2009).

Internal and External whistleblowing

There are two types of whistleblowing actions, namely internal and external (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998). The difference between both actions lies in the party against whom the report is made. In internal whistleblowing, reporting is addressed to a party or person who is present in the same organisation or company as the complainant, for example the supervisor or internal control division, who has the authority to take action on violations that occur. This action is usually taken because the violation is considered only detrimental to the company or organisation, so that the reporter feels it is sufficient to report it to their internal party. Meanwhile, in external whistleblowing, the report is made against parties outside the reporting organisation or company, as well as perpetrators of violations, such as law enforcement officers or mass media. This action is carried out because the violations are detrimental to both the company and society at large. In addition, the whistle-blower considers that it is not enough to just report to internal parties, but must involve external parties who have the authority to take action on the violations. In this study, the whistleblowing concept used more precisely is external whistleblowing. The KPK is considered an institution that is outside the organisational structure of the reporting party and is expected to be able to take an action to give punishment to the perpetrators of violations.

Methods

This study uses data from several sources, including the KPK, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the Central Statistics Agency (BPS). The KPK is data on the number of public complaints to the KPK regarding corruption crimes and the number of corruption cases that have entered the investigation stage. BPS is data on the Indonesian Democracy Index and Old School Expectations. Data from the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) is PBJ deviation data originating from the IHPS annual report (Summary of provisional examination results).

The data covers 486 Cities/Regencies from 32 Provinces throughout Indonesia in the period of 2014-2017. The sample in this study was 484 cities/districts located in 32 provinces throughout Indonesia except for districts/cities from North Kalimantan Province and DKI Jakarta. Banggai Laut Regency, Bulungan Regency, Buton Selatan Regency, Buton Tengah Regency, Mahakam Ulu Regency, Malaka Regency, Malinau Regency, Mamuju Tengah Regency, Manokwari Selatan Regency, Morowali Utara Regency, Muna Barat Regency, Musi Rawas Utara Regency, Nunukan Regency, Pangandaran Regency, Pegunungan Arfak Regency, Penukal Abab Lematang Regency, Pesisir Barat Regency, Pulau Taliabu Regency, Sumba Barat Daya Regency, Tana Tidung Regency, Tulang Bawang Barat Regency, and Tarakan City were not included due to the lack of data. Meanwhile, the City/Regency of DKI Jakarta Province was not included because the data cannot be distinguished between complaints to the provincial or central government and those made to state institutions.

The bound variable in this study is the complaint variable, namely the number of public complaints to the KPK related to corruption. The number of public complaints is assumed to be a proxy for the whistle-blower intention of the people of an area to report corruption crimes that occur in their respective regions. It is assumed that the higher the intention of the community report, the higher the number of public complaints received by the KPK. This variable is a discrete variable that has a non-negative integer value (0, 1 complaint, 2 complaints, and so on).

Based on the study objectives, the main explanatory variable used in this study is the ratio of case handling. This variable is a proxy for Organisational Commitment, which is one of the elements of the whistle-blower triangle (pressure/incentive). This variable is the division between the number of cases entering the investigation stage by the KPK compared to the number of public complaints to the KPK related to corruption in a city/regency over a certain period. The following is the formula for calculating the ratio:

$$\text{Case handling ratio} = \frac{\text{Number of corruption cases entering the KPK's investigation stage}}{\text{number of public complaints}}$$

The use of this ratio in this variable is intended to provide a clear benchmark for the seriousness of the KPK in handling corruption cases in a region. The score of this variable is a non-negative decimal number. The greater the ratio, the higher the level of cases carried out by the KPK compared to the number of complaints received from the public, and vice versa. Given the purpose of this research is to analyse the correlation between last year's case handling and complaints received in the current year, the case handling ratio variable is the previous year's case handling ratio (lag 1).

The second explanatory variable is education, which is a proxy for individual factor. Its value is the expectation of school duration in an area. School duration expectation is considered more capable of projecting an area's education level compared to the previously used school enrolment rate. Indeed, at the level of aggregation analysis, the education variable is irrelevant because this variable is individual. However, referring to the research of Near & Miceli (1995) and Vadera et al. (2009), where the level of education has a significant influence on reporting intentions (whistle-blower intention) at the individual level, this variable is still used as a control.

The third explanatory variable is avgdemocracy, which is Average Score of Civil Freedom Aspects at Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) in a City/Regency. This variable is a proxy for situational factors, namely organisational characteristics, which can affect whistleblowing intention. The data used is the score in aspect of civil freedom on the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) compiled by BPS. This indicator is used as an assessment of the level of tolerance given to

the community in the context of conveying opinions or expressions related to the public administration process. The data is then averaged for each province from 2014-2017. This is done because the democracy index tends not to change within a short time period, so if the estimate is still carried out between years, the results are generally insignificant. The measurement of this variable is at the provincial level and the score ranges from 0-100; the higher the score, the more the province guarantees freedom of expression.

The fourth explanatory variable is the ratio of corruption. This variable is a proxy for Situational Factors, namely characteristics of violations. This variable tries to provide an overview of the actual corruption that has occurred and describes the severity of corruption in an area. This variable is lag because it is assumed that a complaint made by someone is carried out after the occurrence of corruption. Therefore, the value of the corruption ratio used is the ratio of the previous year (lag 1). The value of this variable is the division between the value of deviations in the procurement of goods and services as a result of the BPK audit with capital and goods expenditures in a City/Regency. The following is the formula for calculating the ratio:

$$\text{Corruption ratio} = \frac{\text{Value of deviation in procurement of goods and services based on the result of BPK audit in a region}}{\text{Value of capital expenditure and goods and services of a region}}$$

Table 1. Explanation of Variables and Data Sources

No.	Variable	Definition	Status	Unit	Source
1.	Complaint	Number of public complaints related to corruption crimes in a City / Regency received by KPK	Dependent Variable	Complaint	KPK
2.	Handling Case Ratio Lag1	Number of corruption cases handled and investigated by KPK compared to the number of public complaints related to corruption crimes in a city/ district on year <i>t-1</i>	Main Explanatory Variable	0,1,2 ...	KPK
3.	AvgDemocracy	Average Score of Civil Freedom Aspects (at IDI) in a City/ Regency during 2014-2017	Explanatory Variable	0 – 100	BPS
4.	Education	Education Level of a region measured from the School Duration Expectation Score in a City/ Regency	Explanatory Variable	Year	BPS
5.	L. Corruption Ratio	Value of deviation in procurement of goods and service based on BPK audit results compared to the value of capital expenditure and goods services in a city/ regency on year <i>t-1</i>	Explanatory Variable	0-1	BPK
6.	L. Complaint	Number of public complaints related to corruption crimes in a City / Regency received by KPK on year <i>t-1</i>	Explanatory Variable	Complaint	KPK

To find out the correlation between the handling of corruption cases and the number of public complaints to the KPK, an empirical model was made for estimation. The number of public complaints related to corruption in an area *i* in year *t* is a function of the ratio of case handling by KPK lag 1, the average democracy index, education level, corruption ratio lag1 and the number of public complaints lag 1. Equation of the panel regression model adopted is as follows:

$$\text{Complaint}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Case Handling Ratio}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{Education}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{AvgDemocracy}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Corruption Ratio}_{it-1} + \beta_5 \text{Complaint}_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

In this research, the analytical method used is Dynamic Panel Data Regression. The dynamic panel data regression method is a method to determine the dynamic of a current piece of data and those which have a relationship with previous data. In the empirical model of this method, there

is a lag of the dependent variable (bound) which is used as the independent variable. Dynamic panel data regression is a value of a variable that is influenced by the value of another variable at the present time and also has a relationship with the past (Arellano & Bond, 1991).




Figure 2. Research framework

To choose a panel regression model that can be used, it is necessary to test whether the dependent variable has a time correlation. If the dependent variable does not have a time correlation, then the PLS regression model or fixed effect can be used. However, if the dependent variable has a time correlation, then the PLS and fixed effect models cannot be used because there is a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption. As an alternative, dynamic panel data regression method can be adopted. Dynamic panel data regression is a value of a variable that is influenced by the value of another variable at the present time and also has a relationship with the past. (Arellano & Bond, 1991).

Table 2. Comparison of panel regression models

Variables	(1) PLS	(2) Fixed Effect	(3) Arellano Bond	(4) Model GMM
Rasio_penanganan_kasus_lag1	4.056 (2.520)	3217 (2.102)	5.045** (2.414)	5.361* (2.736)
Pendidikan	0.207* (0.124)	0.337 (1.050)	1.148 (1.133)	16.29*** (1.033)
avgDemograsi	0.021* (0.0124)		-0.0681 (0.214)	1.575*** (0.208)
L.Rasiokorupsi	-0.0171 (0.043)	-0.0141 (0.0357)	-0.0156 (0.0449)	-0.00748 (0.0509)
d2015	-3.413 (0.426)	-1.022** (0.436)	-1.483*** (0.562)	4.373*** (0.568)
d2016		-1.254*** (0.435)	-1.431*** (0.431)	3.667*** (0.420)
d2017	1.185 (0.447)		-0.288 (0.337)	2.008*** (0.363)
L.Aduan	0.753*** (0.0089)	-0.055** (0.0195)	0.0443* (0)	
Constant	-31.14*** (3.928)	6.323 (13.39)	0 (0)	-308.3*** (14.39)
Observations	1,447	1,447	1,452	1,936
R-squared	0.062	0.033		
Number of Kode		484	484	484

Standard error in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The Table 2 shows a comparison of four regression models. Models one and two use the usual panel regression method, while models three and four use dynamic panel data regression model. L.complaint variable is the lag variable from the dependent variable. The estimation result shows that the L.complaint variable is significantly correlated with the dependent variable, namely the complaint variable in models one and two. Therefore, there has been a violation of strict exogeneity assumption, so the PLS and fixed effect models (models one and two) cannot be used because there will be a bias in the estimation results. Therefore, only models three and four are used. After eliminating models one and two, it is necessary to select a model to be used in this study between models three and four. The author prefers to use model four (GMM model) because this model is simpler and the number of observations is larger than model three.

Results and Discussion

Result

Based on the results of the dynamic data panel regression analysis of the GMM model in Figure 2, the following results are obtained: **First**, The case handling ratio of lag 1 is positively and significantly correlated with the number of complaints at an error level of 10%. This means that the higher the case-handling ratio, the higher the number of public complaints received by the KPK in the following year; **Second**, The education level is positively and significantly correlated with the number of complaints. This means that the higher the level of public education in an area, the greater the number of public complaints related to alleged corruption in the area; **Third**, Avg democracy is positively and significantly correlated with the number of complaints. This means that regions with a high democracy average index tend to have a high number of complaints; **Fourth**, Corruption ratio lag 1 does not have a significant correlation with the number of complaints. This means that the high ratio of corruption in an area does not increase the number of public complaints, and vice versa; **Fifth**, L1 complaint (lag 1) has positive and significant correlation with the current number of complaints. This means that, if the number of complaints in the previous year was high, then the number of complaints in the current year also tends to be high, and vice versa; and Sixth, The regression equation is as follows:

$$Y = -308,311 + 5,361 X1 + 16,291 X2 + 1,574 X3 - 0.007 X4 + 0.209 X5$$

Where:

Y = Complaint

X1 = Case handling ratio lag 1

X2 = Education

X3 = Democracy Average

X4 = Corruption Ratio lag 1

X5 = Complaint lag 1

Discussion

Based on the results of the dynamic data panel regression of the GMM model, the case handling ratio lag 1 is positively and significantly correlated with the number of public complaints related to corruption. This means that the corruption case handling already carried out is positively correlated with people's intentions to report corruption. It can also be said that the handling of cases that have been carried out so far has been able to provide confidence to the complainant that the report to be filed will be followed up and handled properly, meaning that the public is willing to report allegations of corruption in their respective regions. This is in accordance with the findings of previous research conducted by Taylor and Curtis (2013), where the sincerity of an organisation in handling reports of violations has a positive effect on whistleblowing intention.

In terms of community involvement in eradicating corruption, the positive correlation between the case handling ratio and the number of complaints is a good thing. Improving the case handling performance will also increase community involvement in reporting violations. Conversely, decreasing case handling performance will reduce the number of public complaints to the KPK. However, the improvement in the handling of corruption cases indicates that the level of

corruption in an area is still high. This needs to be taken into account; that corruption still occurs a lot even though the handling of corruption cases is improving in efficiency.

The next finding in this study is that the Democracy Index average is positively and significantly correlated with the number of public complaints. The higher the democracy index, the higher the number of public complaints. This indicates that a democratic and conducive society which guarantees freedom of expression of its citizens makes the public participate in supervising the public administration by the government by reporting any suspected violations or corruptions. In a democratic society, threats or disturbances to reporting violations should be minimised. With minimal threats and disturbances, the level of community participation in controlling the public administration process increases.

The next finding is that the education level of the community in an area is positively and significantly correlated with the number of community complaints. This means that the better the level of public education in an area, the higher the number of complaints from the community in that area. The higher the level of education, the more intelligent and critical people are of the government, meaning the level of public supervision of irregularities by the government is also higher. This is in accordance with the findings of research conducted by Near & Miceli (1995) dan Vadera et al. (2009), where education has a positive effect on whistleblowing intentions.

The next finding in this study is that the Corruption Ratio variable last year was not significantly correlated with the number of public complaints today. The high number of violations in the procurement of goods and services found by the BPK audit last year did not lead to a high number of public complaints this year. The insignificance of PBJ deviations to the number of public complaints may occur because the results of the BPK audit are less known to the public, meaning they are less able to encourage the public to report deviations. In addition, given the hidden nature of corruption, the public are unable to identify the severity of the corruption. Corruption is only known by the public if the act of corruption has been successfully uncovered by law enforcers. Due to its hidden nature, actual corruption that occurs in an area is not correlated with the number of public complaints. It is also possible that the community does feel that there are abnormalities or indications of abnormalities in a project, but because they are not sure whether these abnormalities are deviant, the community does not report them.

The last finding is that there is a positive and significant correlation between the number of current complaints and the number of complaints in the previous year. This means that there is a persistent number of public complaints from year to year. If last year there were many reports of criminal acts of corruption, the public also tends to report a lot of allegations of corruption in the following year. Conversely, if in the last year the number of complaints was small, in the following year the number of complaints tends to be small as well.

Conclusion

Based on the results and discussion above, several conclusions can be drawn as follows: (1) The case handling ratio in the last year was positively and significantly correlated with the number of public complaints in the current year. This means that the handling of cases carried out by KPK in the last year was positively and significantly correlated with the number of complaints received by the KPK in this year; (2) The level of education, the Democracy Index and the Number of Complaints in the last year were also positively and significantly correlated with the number of public complaints; and (3) The corruption ratio is not significantly correlated with the number of public complaints.

Recommendation

The recommended policy that can be given based on the results of the research is that the KPK should improve its case handling performance, so that the public is more involved in efforts to eradicate corruption by reporting alleged corruption cases to KPK.

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