Three years of the corruption eradication commission’s institutional reform: A narrative policy analysis

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Abstract: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) has been in a dramatic institutional transition since the enactment of the Second Amendment of the CEC Law in 2019, followed by a series of subsequent policies. The policy narrative presented by the government and the DPR as the policy-making actors is that the policy was carried out to strengthen the performance of the KPK. Meanwhile, counter-narratives emerged that said the opposite. This discourse took place intensively from 2019 to 2022, judging by the number of media reports. As a result of the narrative debate, based on several surveys, the KPK experienced a significant decline in the level of trust from the public. Using the Narrative Policy Analysis, this study poses the question: how does the government construct the KPK’s institutional reform policy narrative? This research finds that the government policy narrative is built on distant belief systems, but is not accompanied by adequate positive incentives, resulting in a prolonged polemic. In this study, it is suggested that the government conduct a comprehensive evaluation study of this policy, open a space for open dialogue by involving counter-narrative actors, and conduct a better policy advocacy.

Keywords: anti-corruption, corruption eradication commission, institutional reform of the KPK, narrative policy analysis


Introduction

Since the legislation of the second amendment of the KPK Law through Law No. 19 of 2019 (hereinafter: Law No. 19/2019), the KPK has undergone drastic institutional changes. Some of the main changes in Law 19/2019 include: (1) the institutional position of the KPK in the executive cluster; (2) the status of KPK employees as State Civil Apparatus (ASN); (3) establishment of the KPK Supervisory Board (Dewas); (4) strengthening the function of prevention; (5) changes in the provisions of investigators and investigators; and (5) re-arrangement of law enforcement functions. These five fundamental changes affect the institutional characteristics of the KPK, having a direct impact on the performance of the KPK as a public institution. This is in line with what was conveyed by Gemperle (2018), that institutional characteristics are one of the factors that have an important influence on the effectiveness of an anti-corruption institution.

As a follow-up to Law no. 19/2019, the KPK internally implemented a series of transitional institutional reform policies, starting with Government Regulation Number 41 of 2020, which regulates the status shifting of KPK employees to State Civil Apparatus (ASN), followed by changes in organisation and work procedures, the selection process for KPK employees to become ASN, the launch of the trident strategy through the Corruption Eradication Roadmap 2011-2045 document, Functional Position in passing process, and so on. At time of writing, the process of institutional reform within the KPK is still ongoing.

Amid these internal institutional reforms, and coinciding with the third year after the second revision of the KPK Law, the level of public trust in the KPK was found to be low in several surveys. In 2022, the level of public trust in the KPK is only 46.4%, down from 84.8% in 2018 (Indikator Politik, 2022). The prestige of the KPK is also at its lowest point in the last five years (Kompas, 2022). The KPK is also the law enforcement agency with the lowest level of trust, below the Police,
the Attorney General’s Office, and the Courts (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2022). In comparison, in 2008, the KPK was the most publicly trusted law enforcement agency (Jakarta Post, 2008).

From 2019 to 2022, the KPK's institutional reform policy led to intensive public debate. The debates occurred between the government (including the DPR) as the main narrative makers of the policy, and the interest groups who oppose the policy as speakers of the counter-narrative. These occurred around the discussion period of the second amendment to the KPK Law in 2019, as well as around the implementation period of the Law no. 19/2019 in the following years. By using the Digivla media monitoring instrument, we see that there were 3,397 printed news articles and 27,355 online news articles that featured these discussions from September 1, 2019 to August 31, 2022. The discourse is still being discussed in 2022, as illustrated by 64 printed news articles and 642 online news articles.

Van Eeten (2006) explains that every policy narrative submitted by the government, especially concerning important issues in the eyes of the public, will naturally bring up counter-narratives as a form of reaction. These debates between narrative and counter-narrative then influence public perception. Both the main policy narrative and the counter-narrative, although occurring at the meso level, will influence individual perceptions and preferences at the micro level (Shanahan et al., 2018). The government's narrative is considered successful if it is able to get more public support than the counter-narrative. The decline in the level of public trust in the KPK in various surveys in 2022 is an indication of the government's policy narrative weakness regarding the institutional reform of the KPK, considering that public perceptions are more heavily influenced by the emerging counter-narratives.

Several previous studies describe the efforts to transform the KPK that have occurred over the last decade. Besides recommendations to research a new formulations approach in order to optimise enforcement performance as researched by Ramadhana (2019) and Taryanto & Prasojo (2022), almost all other demands for change, although narrated to improve the performance of the KPK, pose serious institutional risks for the KPK itself, as found in the research of Fariz (2019), Suyatmiko & Nicola (2019), Susanto (2018), Umam (2019), Muttaqin & Susanto (2018), and Widoyoko (2018). The effort to use the Investigation Right by the DPR to the KPK in 2017, for example, although not related to technical matters of law enforcement, succeeded in proving to the public that the definition of the KPK's independence was not absolute, but relative before the DPR (Susanto, 2018). The attempt to revise the KPK Law by the DPR also presented significant institutional risks for the KPK (Muttaqin & Susanto, 2018).

Corruption eradication is one of the Reformation 1998’s mandates, and its success will be an indicator of the maturity of Indonesia’s democracy. With low public support, the KPK's institutional reform policies are at stake. In the midst of this constellation, this study has an important urgency when raising the question: how does the government construct the KPK's institutional reform policy narrative? To answer these questions, this research was conducted with two objectives, namely: (1) conducting a narrative analysis of the KPK’s institutional reform policies from 2019 to 2022; and (2) provide necessary recommendations.

Methods

This study uses a post-positivism approach. The post-positivism approach makes theory an instrument of research, rather than researchers as an instrument, as in a qualitative approach. The reason the researcher uses this approach is to avoid the risk of cognitive bias from the researcher as with the qualitative approach, as well as to explore the problem without requiring a single objectivity as the quantitative approach.

This study uses one form of interpretive discourse analysis: Narrative Policy Analysis as research method. Interpretive discourse analysis is an effective approach to understanding the riddles of seemingly unsolvable public policy dilemmas (Wash, 2020). The main forms of interpretive discourse analysis are Narrative Policy Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis. In Narrative Policy Analysis, aspects of the narrative such as language, physical objects, and actions are assumed to exist in a two-way relationship with values, ideas, and beliefs. Interpretation of the analysis is carried out on the relationship between the narrative and the story it tells (Genette,
1980). If Narrative Policy Analysis only analyses meaning in two dimensions, Critical Discourse Analysis does so in three dimensions: text, discourse, and social context (Wash, 2020). In Critical Discourse Analysis, discourse is integrated with analysis of the social context that surrounds it (Fairclough, 2013), so that it reveals the meaning of discourse on the surface and also criticises it. This research does not go as far as criticising the inter-narrative discourse around the KPK institutional reform policies, therefore it uses Narrative Policy Analysis as its analytical method.

Born in the post-positivism era, Narrative Policy Analysis is a form of qualitative research method used to interpret policy narratives carried out by actors and the policy community (van Eeten, 2006). The steps in conducting policy narrative analysis are: (1) identification of policy issues; (2) data collection; (3) how the data analysis is carried out; and (4) narrative mapping into narrative components (Gray & Jones, 2016). To obtain future policy improvements, the policy narrative analysis ends with a metanarrative analysis, which is a comparison between the main narrative and the counter-narrative (van Eeten, 2006). With metanarrative, narrative disparities are expected to be reduced and policies to be improved.

The level of analysis in this study is at the meso level: the level of the main policy actors and groups that interact with them. At the meso level, policy narrative analysis focuses on how actors construct and communicate policy narratives to influence the policy process (Shanahan et al., 2018). Because the meso-level analysis emphasises the narrative of policy actors, and the majority of policy debates by these actors take place in the public sphere, mass media becomes a representative reflection of the discussion. Therefore, the main data in this study was sourced from mass media news articles. The filtering of articles is done using Digivla, a media monitoring instrument. Digivla is able to collect more than 1,200 piece of media, including from print media, online news portals, and television stations (Digivla Indonesia, 2020). The news articles collected for this research are in the form of print and electronic mass media articles for the period of September 1, 2019 to August 31, 2022. The main data analysed is in the form of print mass media, with electronic mass media in addition.

This article uses a documentation study as a data collection technique, and an illustrative method as an analysis technique. Documentation studies were carried out mainly on printed news articles and electronic news articles which were used selectively as adjuncts. The content of the printed mass media analysed was limited to Kompas, Koran Tempo, and The Jakarta Post. These three newspapers were chosen because they are ranked as the top three best newspapers in Indonesia based on data from the 2019 Top Newspaper in Indonesia (4 International Media and Newspaper, 2020). Meanwhile, the data analysis technique in this study was carried out using the illustrative method, which is a form of qualitative data analysis method that takes theoretical concepts and treats them as "empty boxes" to then be filled with empirical data and its description (Neuman, 2014). The illustrative method used is in the form of case clarification and dynamic pattern matching. Case clarification is a method of making a case easier to understand by applying theory to it. Meanwhile, the pattern matching method is used to match cases with patterns or concepts derived from other theories or research.

The fact that mass media outlets are able to influence social spaces through the power of their text (Lefebvre, 1991), either as one of the four pillars of democracy or because of their ideologies is considered as a limitation in this study. The abilities of the mass media are beyond interpretation in this study.

**Results and Discussion**

The basic policy of the KPK’s institutional reform is contained in Law no. 19/2019 as the second amendment to Law No. 30/2002. Through this amendment, the KPK underwent a substantial change to its institutional characteristics (see Table 1). To realise the mandate of the changes in the law, the KPK, together with the government, carried out a series of follow-up policies in the form of institutional reforms within the KPK. The narrative of the policy was constructed by the government (including the DPR in it) from 2019, ahead of the discussion of the second amendment to the KPK Law. Community groups who did not agree with the policy raised simultaneous counter-narratives. The debate between these narratives continued from the period
after the ratification of Law no. 19/2019 to 2022 when this research was conducted. As a basic policy, the revision of the KPK Law is still the main narrative debated by community groups, considering that the current KPK internal institutional reform is a follow-up policy from the revision of the KPK Law.

### Table 1. Norms Change in the KPK Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Law 30/2002 &amp; Law 10/2015</th>
<th>Law 19/2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional position of the KPK in Indonesian constitutional law</td>
<td>State institutions which in carrying out their duties and authorities are independent and free from the influence of any power</td>
<td>State institutions in the executive cluster which in carrying out their duties and authorities are independent and free from the influence of any power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of the KPK employees</td>
<td>Commission Employee</td>
<td>State Civil Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of Supervisory Board Prevention function strengthening</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Supervisory Board is established (Article 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of investigators</td>
<td>KPK Investigators are to be appointed and discharged by the KPK</td>
<td>KPK Investigators are to come from police, the attorney general, other government institutions, and the KPK, which will be appointed and discharged by the KPK leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-arrangement of law enforcement functions</td>
<td>1. Arrangement of execution function 2. Reduction of nine authorities in preliminary investigation and prosecution 3. Provisions for coordinating prosecution activities 4. Re-arrangement of tapping procedure 5. Authority to terminate investigation and prosecution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Narrative discussion on the KPK’s institutional reform policies have been reflected in media. In this study, a recounting of news articles containing discussions between narratives was carried out using the Digivla media monitoring instrument. The search configuration was carried out using the keyword *Revisi UU KPK* (Revision of the KPK Law) in the text search feature on content (not just titles) in the period from September 1, 2019 to August 31, 2022. The keyword "Revision of the KPK Law" is used because in addition to being a basic narrative policy, it also becomes a neutral vocabulary that is commonly used in both the main narrative and the counter-narrative. The search feature selected the content search option (instead of the keyword search option in the title) to find news articles that contained the substance of the discussion between these narratives, even though they did not contain titles containing keyword text. The search period was limited to the period of September 1, 2019 (when the issue of discussing the second amendment to the KPK Bill in the DPR began to be hotly discussed), until August 31, 2022. The categories of mass media that were captured were (1) national and regional mass media published in print, and (2) national and regional mass media published online, covering more than one hundred verified news sites. For each category of mass media, the search was carried out separately.

### Table 3. Search Configuration using Digivla

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>Revisi UU KPK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search area</td>
<td>Content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>1 September 2019 - 31 August 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>1. Printed media 2. Online media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There were 3,397 news articles in printed media and 27,355 online news articles containing discussions of the narrative in the period of 2019 to 2022. The most discussions were recorded in 2019, although they occurred in only four months (September to December), a total of 2,664 printed articles and 19,062 articles online. The second highest number of discussions occurred in 2020 for printed media and 2021 for online mass media. The data for the first two years describes narrative discussions with relatively equal intensity. In 2022 to the end of August, there were 64 printed news articles and 642 online articles containing this narrative discussion. Although it is starting to decline, this figure shows that the issue of KPK institutional reform is still relevant in society this year. This decline in numbers can be attributed to the intensity of policy narratives that are starting to become anticlimactic. On one hand, further reforms within the KPK continue to roll in accordance with the mandate of Law Number 19/2019, and on the other, any counter-narratives that emerged from 2019 can be said to have failed to influence the policy implementation process. Interestingly, in the last two months the discussion of this topic has warmed up again, with 16 printed news articles and 110 online articles, after the previous highest intensity occurred in April, with 19 printed articles and 127 online articles.

Table 4. Search Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Sep-Dec 2019*</th>
<th>Jan-Dec 2020</th>
<th>Jan-Dec 2021</th>
<th>Jan-Aug 2022**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Printed</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,397</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online</td>
<td></td>
<td>27,355</td>
<td>3568</td>
<td>4,083</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*September 2019 was the initial time of the KPK Law amendment process  
**August 2022 was the last month before this article was written  
processed from Digivla

Narrative Identification

According to Gray & Jones (2016) and Roe (1994), the narrative policy analysis process is carried out through: (1) identifying the policy narrative, non-narrative, or counternarrative; (2) arranging them into a more systematic form, can be in the form of plots or other components; and (3) performing a metanarrative analysis to find a solution to the existing narrative conflict. Mapping is needed because it is a manifestation of policy narratives which, in addition to distinguishing between narratives and others, is also used to measure the level of persuasiveness of the narratives in influencing the population (Shanahan et al., 2018).

To make it easier, the identification is poured into a chronological resume of policy narratives that summarises the overall journey of the story. It depicts the plot of the existing narrative. The main source of narrative identification in this research is news articles that are netted through Digivla based on the search configuration as described previously. To compose a narrative resume, a reduction in the number of articles has been made for a documentation study. The selection qualifications for the articles to be conducted in the documentation study are articles that: (1) originate from the mainstream national mass media, with the chosen outlets being Kompas, Tempo, and The Jakarta Post; and (2) in the form of printed media. This print media study was conducted on resumes that have been provided by the Digivla online application. To complete this study, a documentation study was also conducted on limited online news articles with a random selection, as well as on other valid and relevant documents. From the documentation study carried out, a narrative resume was compiled chronologically as set out in Table 5. The resume also identifies which narratives are presented by the government and which are the counter-narratives that appear.

Metanarrative Analysis

Metanarratives are narratives "told" by comparisons (van Eeten, 2006). Government policy narratives are compared and contrasted with counter-narratives. By comparing, the relationship between the two narratives that was previously invisible becomes visible, as well as the reason for the difference. According to van Eeten, comparison in metanarrative does not mean making compromises: for example, if one side is black and the other side is white, then the metanarrative
Metanarratives are narratives that can explain how conflicting policy narratives are about a particular issue at the same time. The purpose of metanarrative analysis is to obtain a metanarrative that allows the parties who have previously argued to be able to improve the policy later. In other words, the output of the metanarrative analysis is a recommendation to improve the quality of the analysed policy.

Table 5. Narrative Resume

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The DPR on September 5, 2019, held a Plenary Meeting to approve the discussion of the second amendment to the KPK Bill as an initiative of the DPR. All factions have agreed, the government has also agreed.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The afternoon after the Plenary Meeting, the KPK held a press conference rejecting the revision of the KPK Law and asked the President for support through a letter on the grounds that the planned revision would weaken the function of the KPK as an independent institution.</td>
<td>Counter-narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>TII held a press conference on September 6, 2019, rejecting the revision of the KPK Law by highlighting the problems of KPK’s independence which would be disrupted through the revision.</td>
<td>Counter-narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>On September 9, 2019, the Minister of Law and Human Rights received the second amendment to the KPK Law. Menkumham will study the draft first, according to the President’s direction.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>A number of academics from 27 universities expressed their rejection of the revision of the KPK Law.</td>
<td>Counter-narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>On September 11, 2019, the President received the Second Amendment to the Problem List of the KPK Law and stated that he would involve experts to review it. In the evening, the Minister of State Secretary stated that the President’s letter had been submitted to the DPR.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The next day, the DPR Legislative Board discussed the draft, the Menkumham was present in the discussion.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The President held a press conference on September 13, 2019, stating his commitment not to compromise in fighting corruption. The President rejected some of the proposed changes which he considered would weaken the KPK.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>The KPK stated that it was not involved in this revision process. The KPK chairman stated that he had never known the second amendment to the KPK Law.</td>
<td>Counter-narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>The KPK leaders return the mandate to the President.</td>
<td>Counter-narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>The President rejected the return of the mandate by asserting that the provision for returning a mandate like this had never been regulated.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>On 17 September 2019, the second amendment to the KPK Law was passed.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>The rejection protests increased on a larger scale.</td>
<td>Counter-narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>PP No. 41 of 2020 concerning the Transfer of KPK Employees to ASN and Perkom No. 7 of 2020 concerning Ortaka KPK was enacted.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>The process of transferring status of the KPK Employees to ASN was carried out in 2021, through the TWK mechanism.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Some people deplore a number of KPK employees who did not pass the TWK by perceiving it as an expulsion.</td>
<td>Counter-narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>KPK employees who meet the requirements are appointed as ASN.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>The KPK developed a trident strategy as stated in the 2022-2045 Corruption Eradication Roadmap document as a message for changes after the second revision of the KPK Law.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>The level of public trust in the KPK declined in several surveys in 2022.</td>
<td>Counter-narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>The KPK institutional reform process continues.</td>
<td>Narrative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the metanarrative analysis of this research, a series of events in the chronological resume, as shown in Table 5, are mapped and compared the main points between the main policy narrative and the counternarrative, as shown in Table 6. From this comparison, the reasons for the differences are drawn.
Table 6. Narrative Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narratives</th>
<th>Counter-Narratives</th>
<th>Difference Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPK’s performance has not been optimal so it needs to be improved institutionally.</td>
<td>Political actors are worried about the performance of the KPK so far.</td>
<td>The difference in belief systems is that one party considers the performance of the KPK to be in need of improvement, while the other party sees that the KPK is already good, so that the reasons for improvement are unfounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The norms that changed in the second amendment bill are a form of institutional strengthening for the KPK. The entry of the KPK into the executive cluster and the change in the status of KPK employees to ASN are forms of institutional strengthening and state order.</td>
<td>These norms are a form of institutional weakening of the KPK.</td>
<td>Differences in contradictory belief systems, see the same content but have conflicting interpretations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The President and the DPR prioritise the aspirations of the people and have conducted sufficient studies in the revision process of the KPK Law.</td>
<td>The entry of the KPK into the executive cluster and the change in the status of KPK employees to ASN will reduce the independence of the KPK. Independence is an absolute requirement for the success of anti-corruption institutions.</td>
<td>Differences in belief systems regarding the same phenomenon. One party sees this change for the sake of law and order, the other party sees this change as disturbing independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A series of transitional reform policies within the KPK (transfer of employee status, trident strategy, and others) is a follow-up to Law no. 19/2019 which runs in harmony to support the institutional strengthening of the KPK.</td>
<td>Follow-up policies within the KPK are evidence of the existence of institutional weakening.</td>
<td>The parties who are invited to discuss with the government and the DPR are indeed part of the community, but they do not adequately represent the community groups that make up the counter-narrative. Apart from belief systems, not all provisions regarding further policies are clearly regulated in the derivative regulations of Law no. 19/2019 which causes debate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: processed by researcher

Each policy narrative is basically unique, meaning it can create different narrative realities in society (Shanahan et al., 2018). This is what Shanahan et al. call narrative relativity. Although varied and insurmountable, the reality of this narrative can be measured because it is limited by belief systems and policy strategies. Belief systems are a set of values that determine the orientation of individuals or groups towards something. This system is relatively stable in nature within the individual or group, so it can be measured from the beginning. Policy narratives that sparked discussions due to differences in belief systems indicate that there is a lack of risk mitigation in the policy formulation process. These differences create “social distance” in the policy narrative. Because it is not properly mitigated, the narrative content created does not contain elements that are capable of persuading the target audience with different views.

Policy narratives that are built on the basis of differences in belief systems should be formulated to influence and recruit these different audiences (Mu et al., 2021). For this reason, the narrator should insert an adequate positive message stimulus that is in line with the belief systems owned by the target audience. One of the positive stimuli that can be given by the narrator is the positive reputation embedded in the social construction associated with the target audience. For example, the narrator describes the target group as intelligent, honest, responsible, and the like. Another form of stimulus that can be given is the provision of material benefits, such as subsidies or other tangible things to motivate the target group to want to follow the policy. Likewise, negative forms of stimulus such as the imposition of fines or penalties can also be applied.
In the KPK’s institutional reform policy narrative debates, the narrator often does not include a positive stimulus to persuade the counter-narrative group; for example, the absence of positive stimulus from the narrator in responding to the counter-narrative from community groups who intended to file an objection request to the Constitutional Court (MK). Even though a member of the DPR stated that he respected the wishes of the community group, he then asked the party to sanction the MK trial to have a clear legal standing (DPR, 2020). In a textual semiotic sense, this statement has a meaning: it is as if a group of people who want to submit an application do not have legal standing and will make the Constitutional Court trial impermissible. Making the MK trial not sacred is not a positive form of stimulus. The counter-narrative group who hears this narrative will not feel embraced. The DPR member’s statement did not narrow the social distance relative to the existing narrative. Instead, members of the DPR could choose other sentences such as: “We respect the wishes of citizens who wish to file an objection to the Constitutional Court. It is a form of good and responsible citizenship.” Maintaining the sanctity of the trial or the clarity of the applicant’s legal standing in submitting a test to the Constitutional Court is a normal procedure that is generally known by the public, along with the related mechanisms and consequences.

Another example is the discourse on the process of transferring KPK employees to ASN. When spawning the policy of Government Regulation No. 41 of 2020 which regulates the transfer, the government conveyed several positive stimuli in the narrative including: this PP does not reduce the independence of the KPK; this PP is to strengthen KPK institutions; and the income of employees who change status will not decrease (www.presidenri.go.id, 2020). The Constitutional Court decided in the Constitutional Court Decision No. 70/PUU-XVII/2019 that the transfer process must not harm the rights of employees (Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2021a). This quote from the Constitutional Court’s Decision was then narrated by the government (DPR, 2021). These things become a positive stimulus for the counter-narrative group. Among these are reflected in the statement by the Director of Pusako, Andalas University, who said that the statement benefited KPK employees who did not pass the selection process in the transfer of status (Kompas, 2021). The next Constitutional Court in Decision No. 34/PUU-XIX/2021 details the meaning of the phrase “not harmed” into four contexts: individual KPK employees, institutions, ASN, and the state, which in conclusion explains that there are criteria that must still be met in the transfer of KPK employees (Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2021b). In fact, the phrase “not harmed” was interpreted by the counter-narrative group that all existing KPK employees will switch status to ASN, because if someone does not switch, it is included in the definition of "disadvantaged". It emerged later that a number of KPK employees were declared unable to be transferred to their status as ASN. From the narrator’s side, this was in accordance with the provisions, including in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s Decision, while on the contra-narrator’s side it was considered contrary to existing provisions, including the Constitutional Court’s Decision. This “not harmed” narrative dialogue was not completed, so the polemic continued.

The wide social distance difference in the debate over the KPK’s institutional reform narratives is rooted in differences in the meaning of the substance of the underlying issue, even before the narrative of the revision of the KPK Law began. The dynamics of the demands for transformation of the KPK have been present since the last decade. The substance of the issue lies in the independence of the KPK as an institution and its dependence on government political support. As UNCAC outlined in Article 6, anti-corruption agencies must have the necessary independence to work effectively (UNODC, 2004), and this independence depends on the political support of the government, particularly from the highest political power in the country (Quah, 2014). The excellent reputation of the KPK is due to the success of its performance so far, which is influenced by the strength of independence possessed by the KPK (Muhammad, 2016) whose existence is maintained because of political support from the President (Juwono, 2018). This independence is inseparable from the government’s political will to eradicate corruption, which is reflected in the commitment and decision making of policy solutions (Suyatmiko & Nicola, 2019). The solutions taken by both President SBY and President Jokowi when the KPK faced institutional conflicts were examples of such political support (Fariz, 2019).

Independence, according to Suyatmiko & Nicola, also includes the institutional position of the KPK, whether inside or outside the government. Before being regulated in Law no. 19/2019, the
in institutional position of the KPK was once a lively debate when the DPR wanted to exercise its Investigation Rights to the KPK in 2017 (Susanto, 2018). According to Susanto, at that time the public questioned whether as an independent institution, the KPK was the object of the DPR's Investigation Right. There are two opinions: (1) although independent, the KPK is part of the executive, considering that the task of investigating and prosecuting is the task of the executive; and (2) The KPK, as a state auxiliary organ, has a position that is separate from the three branches of power—even a separate branch—so it is not an object of the DPR's Investigation Right. The Constitutional Court then determined that the right is constitutional, meaning that although it does not interfere with the technical affairs of law enforcement by the KPK, the fact that the independence of the KPK is not absolute, but relative before the DPR can be interpreted by the public. Therefore, when it is stated that the KPK exists within the executive branch—even though it is stated that the KPK in carrying out its duties remains independent and free from the influence of any power—the perception that revised laws can weaken the KPK cannot be avoided. Although the government narrated that the change was carried out in order to strengthen the KPK, the narrative was not immediately accepted by the public, because alternative meanings were already available based on previous real events.

Political support for the KPK has decreased in recent years, especially ahead of the law revision process (Fariz, 2019). When the counter-narrative voice stated that the planned revision of the KPK Law was a form of weakening, the public hoped that there would be a policy solution to the current polemic, for example by not giving approval for amendments or issuing a Perppu (Suyatmiko & Nicola, 2019). The government did not do so. In the public’s understanding, this decision was not a form of political support for the KPK. But, of course, the government has its own reasons for its actions. The government’s priority is the achievement of economic growth targets, particularly through licensing efficiency in order to bring in high investment. For this reason, political stability is a prerequisite for increasing economic performance. There was a narrative that potential investors were afraid of the aggressiveness of the KPK, meaning they were reluctant to invest in Indonesia (Umam, 2019). Because it is assumed to be a factor influencing political and economic stability, the KPK needs to be aligned with its movement power to act in a "reasonable" corridor. The government looks to maintain a safe distance from the KPK, for example by leaving the KPK alone in dealing with political pressure situations, including in the form of revisions to the KPK Law (Muttaqin & Susanto, 2018).

After the legislation of Law No. 19/2019, the KPK became a main actor of the reform policies. The KPK was also involved in formulating further policies in the form of various commission regulations, as well as implementing them. In this case, there was an expansion of narrative actors from the government and the DPR, to the government, the DPR, and the KPK, with the portion of the KPK being the largest because the domain of further policy is within its area. In 2020, the transition process after the amendment to the KPK Law was marked by the issuance of two derivative regulations: PP No. 41/2020 and KPK Regulation No. 7/2020 regarding the new KPK Organisation and Work Procedure. The following year, the transition process was dominated by the process of changing the status of KPK employees to ASN, starting with the promulgation of a Commission Regulation regarding the procedure for the transfer at the beginning of the year, then the phase I implementation of the State Moderation Index (IMB) test and interviews during March and April, and then, in the following half year, in the form of the inauguration of civil servants, orientation, training for state defence for employees who do not meet the requirements and the phase II IMB test and interview. Regarding this status transfer process, internal socialisation was carried out in February 2021 (KPK, 2022). In addition to internalisation, employees were also involved intensively in the preparation of regulations regarding organisation and work procedures, as well as regulations on functional positions (KPK, 2021b). The KPK also compiled a 2022-2045 Corruption Eradication Roadmap document to accommodate changes in the legal basis, trident strategy, and a message of change to anticipate the future (KPK, 2021a).

However, through the Public Perceptions Survey of KPK News and Publications in 2021, the KPK found that 66.6% of the public saw internal conflicts within the KPK as one of the main issues that the public knew most about, with a very high level of public awareness of 98.7%. The level of public confidence that the news about the KPK is true also increased to 82.5% from 79.8% in
the previous year (KPK, 2022). This means that a series of internal reform efforts carried out by the KPK attracted public attention, with the majority seeing it as an internal conflict. When added to the results of the public perception survey conducted by the KPK itself, and linked to the results of the Kompas, Political Indicator, and LSI survey in 2022 (which placed the KPK at a low level of trust,) the socialisation that the KPK had during the period of implementing Law no. 19/2019, was clearly not enough to positively affect public perceptions.

The public gives trust to an organisation as a result of the organisation’s performance (Yuwanto, 2019). According to Yuwanto, the public gives their trust through cognitive aspects (what they know) and affective aspects (the emotions they feel). These two aspects become the public’s way of assessing the criteria for a belief. Trust criteria consists of five factors: integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty, and openness (Butler & Cantrell, 1984). Integrity is related to honesty (always telling the truth), competence is related to the ability to do work, consistency means handling situations reliably and with good judgment, loyalty is related to the ability to complete tasks responsibly, and openness means willingness to share information.

In general, the KPK’s institutional reforms narratives in the past three years as seen by the public have not met all the criteria for trust. Policy actors are seen as not being open to several things which then trigger polemics. For example, levels of trust regarding the uncertainty of the mechanism for transferring the status of KPK employees, whether automatically or by testing was not seen as trustworthy. Policy actors are also considered by the public to be unreliable in handling the situation: inputs from interest groups from the time of the revision of the law to the follow-up policies are not given much suggestion. Despite stating that they are open to criticism and suggestion, policy actors seem to limit the space for dialogue with the contra-narrator group.

Considering that the implementation of the KPK’s institutional reform policy over the past three years has brought problems to the reputation of the KPK in the public eye, the KPK as the actor with the most current role must take appropriate mitigation to: (a) resolve the prolonged polemic regarding the institutional changes to the KPK; (b) rebuild public trust; and (c) not to repeat similar mistakes in the future. For this reason, and because the KPK’s institutional reform policy is still ongoing at time of this writing, the recommendation from this paper is that the KPK should develop and implement a good institutional reform policy advocacy strategy.

Policy advocacy should be carried out to: (1) decision makers (KPK Leaders, the President, and the DPR); (2) policy influencers, such as elements of civil society, academics, and interest groups who in the narrative arena take the form of counter-narrative groups; and (3) the general public. The tactics used are adapted to each of these goals, with the desired achievement in the form of behavioural change (Coffman & Beer, 2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Public Will Campaign</td>
<td>Intensify the transmission of information by emphasising the issue of the KPK’s institutional reform in order to create appropriate public perceptions. The KPK needs to open a space for dialogue with the public regarding this policy issue through public relations channels, without the need to evade. So far, KPK social media tends not to respond to criticism from individual communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influencers</td>
<td>Coalition Building</td>
<td>Unite the parties who support the KPK institutional reform policy issues from influential individuals (figures) and groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Makers</td>
<td>Regulatory Feedback</td>
<td>The KPK institutional reform policy has been rolled out, so it is necessary to evaluate the implementation of existing regulations (the KPK Law and its derivatives) as input for better decision making.</td>
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</table>

Source: processed. The target and tactics are adapted from Coffman dan Beer (2015)
Conclusions

This study finds that the KPK’s institutional reform policy narratives, which began with the revision of the KPK Law to a series of subsequent policies, has led to intensive and simultaneous counter-narratives from opposing community groups, from 2019 until now. This indicates that the policy is an important issue for the community, as well as indicating that the policy implementation has not brought full satisfaction to the public. The KPK’s institutional reform policy narratives are built on differences in belief systems, but are often not accompanied by a positive stimulus to persuade the counter-narrative groups. The relativity of this policy narrative spreads a wide social distance, so that it does not stop stirring polemics even in the third year since the policy was first introduced.

When the law is formulated, the government and the DPR are the main policy actors. However, after the legislation, the KPK became the main actor, including conduct formulation and implementation of further policies. The KPK is also become the most affected party. The decline in the KPK’s reputation in the public is a burden that must be repaired first by the KPK itself. The KPK should conduct a comprehensive policy evaluation study, including in the form of regulatory feedback, and complement it with other better advocacy strategies.

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