

Optimizing interagency coordination and supervision in corruption eradication efforts

Dudy Heryadi^{1, a}, Denny Indra Sukmawan^{2, b *}

¹ Universitas Padjadjaran. Jl. Raya Bandung Sumedang KM.21, Sumedang 45363, Indonesia

² Universitas Pembangunan Nasional "Veteran" Jakarta. Jl. RS. Fatmawati Raya, Jakarta 12450, Indonesia

^a dudy.heryadi@unpad.ac.id; ^b denny.indras@upnvj.ac.id

*Corresponding Author

Abstract: This article delves into the coordination and supervision efforts of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) with regional governments, the police, and the prosecution agencies. Such responsibilities are stipulated in Law No. 19 of 2019 on the KPK. In general, our findings indicate that the utilization of MCP, JAGA, and e-SPDP applications has not been optimized as means of coordination and supervision. Furthermore, we identify that coordination and supervision with regional governments can be enhanced through Satgas Wilayah. While the coordination and supervision with the police and attorney can be concentrated on efforts to harmonize the issuance of SP3 and activities related to oversight, research, and the assessment of needs within the KPK, police, and prosecution agencies. Throughout the data collection and analysis process, we also identify substantial weaknesses in the publication of annual reports by the KPK and the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) to the public. This research adopts a descriptive method, guided by the theory of interagency coordination and supported by secondary data from the annual reports of the KPK and ICW, as well as transcripts of proceedings at the Constitutional Court (MK).

Keywords: Corruption; KPK; Supervision; Coordination; Combating Corruption, Police, Attorney

How to Cite: Heryadi, D., & Sukmawan, D. (2023). Optimizing interagency coordination and supervision in corruption eradication efforts. *Integritas : Jurnal Antikorupsi*, 9(2), 213-228. <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v9i2.945>



Introduction

For over 20 years, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has successfully implemented three strategies in the fight against corruption: education, prevention, and prosecution. In broad terms, between 2004 and 2019, KPK handled a total of 1,125 corruption cases. Additionally, at least 39 high-ranking officials in ministries/agencies, 257 members of the People's Representative Council (DPR), and the Regional People's Representative Councils (DPRD), as well as 119 regional leaders (Governors, Regents, and Mayors), have become suspects in corruption cases (KPK, 2019, pp. 68-72). It's worth noting that despite KPK's handling of thousands of cases and the involvement of hundreds of public officials as suspects, the level of corruption in Indonesia remains relatively high. This is evident in Figure 1, where the trend of prosecuting corruption cases based on parameters such as the number of cases, suspects, and potential state losses, consistently shows an upward trajectory over the past four years. The evident of KPK's success is also seen at increasingly of public participation. For instance, throughout 2020, KPK received 1,839 reports of corruption cases from the public. This number increased to 2,127 reports one year later (KPK, 2021).

The logical consequence of the high number of reports mentioned is that KPK cannot pursue all of them. Instead, the reports are forwarded to other relevant institutions, such as the police and the attorney's office. If the evidence is insufficient or does not fall under the category of corruption offenses, then it is returned to the reporter. Therefore, the tasks and authorities of coordination and supervision held by KPK are of strategic importance. Through these tasks and authorities, KPK is expected to serve as both a trigger and an accelerator in anti-corruption efforts. Both roles are increasingly relevant, given that corruption constitutes an "extraordinary crime." In other words, combating corruption cannot be carried out in an ordinary manner or by KPK alone.




Figure 1. Trend of Corruption Eradication (Indonesia Corruption Watch (2020; 2021; 2022 & 2023))

In general, coordination can be defined as working together to achieve common goals. Coordination takes place when a set of decisions has been adjusted for their consequences, so as not to excessively disadvantage one decision or another. In certain cases, these consequences need to be assessed, weighed, and/or measured. In the study of public policy, interagency coordination in the public sector can be seen as an instrument and mechanism aimed at aligning the tasks and functions of each agency. Coordination is used to build greater cohesion and coherence among agencies, reducing or eliminating obstacles, challenges, deficiencies, and contradictions within each agency during the implementation of management and policies (Bouckaert et al., 2010, pp. 14-19).

Therefore, supervision and monitoring activities can be categorized as coordination because they share the goal of cohesion. Interagency coordination is necessary for several reasons (Peters, 2018): from an academic perspective, the development of new public management has led to a paradigm shift where agencies are expected to manage and empower individuals based on specialization. This development has encouraged leaders in relevant agencies to adopt a combined approach from both the compliance-oriented public governance and the efficiency of the private sector.

In reality, issues and problems in public policy are becoming increasingly complex and cannot be addressed in isolation. Addressing issues such as climate change, corruption, and bureaucratic reform requires coordination and coherence among agencies. Therefore, a trend has emerged in the public sector where each agency invests time, resources (human and financial), as well as social and political capital, to establish mechanisms and instruments of coordination. The aim is to achieve effectiveness and efficiency, reduce contradictions, and enhance transparency and accountability. Lastly, coordination is needed to improve the quality of decision-making within each agency (Freeman & Rossi, 2012).

Based on its objectives, coordination can be divided into two types: positive coordination and negative coordination. While the first type is aimed at solving problems together and finding solutions, thereby creating advantages for each participating agency, the second type is aimed at avoiding conflicts between agencies. Coordination can also be divided into two categories based on its mechanisms: formal coordination and non-formal coordination. Formal coordination emphasizes formal outputs such as policies, legislative regulations, strategies, and work plans. Each agency's agendas are accommodated and adopted within this framework (Braun, 2008); (Sampford et al., 2005). On the other hand, non-formal coordination emphasizes informal outputs, such as committees, task groups, working groups, and task forces that have specific tasks, func-

tions, and authorities. In this process, each agency interacts to achieve "collective consciousness" or "collective unity" that is useful for problem-solving (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).

Theoretically, an effective coordination is determined by four factors. First is the allocation of human resources with high quality, capability, dedication, and commitment. This includes the commitment of the coordinating agency to manage the coordination process and lead other agencies. Second is the strong political leadership to direct coordination and empower the individuals or institutions involved in coordination (Razzano, 2016). Third is that coordination cannot be seen solely as the responsibility of the coordinating institution, but also of the other involved agencies, enabling joint actions (OECD, 2015). Fourth, coordination requires clear mandates, authorities, and responsibilities from each agency.

In addition to the normative and theoretical reasons mentioned above, in the context of combating corruption in Indonesia, the discussion of coordination and supervision becomes relevant because these tasks and authorities are not exempt from challenges. KPK leaders recently acknowledges the existence of disparities regarding the quality of cases handled by KPK, the Indonesian National Police (Polri), and the Attorney's General Office (Kejaksaan Agung). There is a tendency for law enforcement in various regions to easily designate individuals as suspects. Additionally, many Preliminary Investigation Reports (SPDP) issued by the Police and the Attorney's Office are not forwarded, with an estimated rate of only about 70-80 percent. Moreover, developments in the handling of corruption cases by the Police and the Attorney's Office are not reported to KPK (Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2023).

Therefore, this article addresses the issues of supervision and coordination by KPK with other agencies involved in corruption eradication. According to the explanation in Law No. 19 of 2019 on the Second Amendment to the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission, corruption eradication includes prevention and prosecution activities. This article focuses on the prevention activities carried out by KPK in coordination with local governments, as well as the prosecution activities carried out by KPK in coordination with the police and the attorney's office.

To provide a more systematic and comprehensive discussion, the issues are formulated in two main questions. First is how to optimize the coordination between KPK and local governments regarding corruption prevention? Second, how to optimize the coordination between KPK and the police and attorney's regarding corruption enforcement? In answering these questions, subsidiary questions are also posed, such as: why is coordination between KPK and local governments, the police, and the attorney's office considered urgent? What is the urgency? What are the priority issues related to the coordination between KPK and local governments, the police, and the attorney's office?

Methods

This study is descriptive. We present numerical data sourced from credible sources, ICW and KPK itself. Then, we explain and analyze this data using theory and case studies and offer solutions to the coordination issues within KPK. All data in this article are secondary data derived from legal verdicts of corruption cases, KPK annual reports, ICW annual reports, and Constitutional Court session records. For statistical data specifically, this article refers to ICW's annual publications on corruption case prosecutions. The rationale behind this choice is ICW's consistency in publishing number-based reports that form the basis for analysis. Moreover, ICW, established since 1998, is a credible institution with a proven track record in anti-corruption issues and studies. Therefore, the process of collecting and screening data from open sources, including corruption cases published in conventional media and social media, has been conducted, leading us to consider the validity of the numbers presented by ICW in its publications as relatively high.

Furthermore, this article utilizes official KPK reports only for comparison purposes, not as the primary reference for statistical data. The primary factor for this is the inconsistency in KPK's annual report publications over the past few years. For example, in KPK reports of 2022 and 2021, there are no attachments provided as seen in KPK reports of 2018, 2019, and 2020. To be more specific, in the 2020 report's Sub-report of the Deputy for Prosecution, the data presented by KPK is limited to the handling of corruption cases by region. Meanwhile, in the 2018 and 2019 sub-

reports, the data is comprehensive, broken down by modus operandi, perpetrators, institutions, and regions.

Result & Discussion

KPK Coordination with Local Governments

We divide the issues of coordination and supervision by KPK in the regions into two priorities. Firstly, the importance of optimizing coordination between KPK and local governments (Pemda), considering that corruption cases are more prevalent at the local level compared to the central level. Secondly, optimizing coordination between KPK and stakeholders in villages due to the consistent upward trend in corruption related to village funds (Indonesia: dana desa) each year. In Figure 2, it is evident that the majority of corruption cases are carried out by district governments, with nearly 400 cases. Following that are village governments with over 350 cases, followed by city governments (90 cases), regional-owned enterprises (BUMD) (75 cases), and provincial governments (53 cases). On the other hand, corruption at the central level, represented by cases involving state-owned enterprises (BUMN) (60 cases), non-ministerial government institutions (21 cases), and ministries (30 cases), only contributes a total of 111 cases.




Figure 2. Trend of Corruption Prosecutions by Type of Institution (Cases)

Source: Indonesia Corruption Watch (2020; 2021; 2022; 2023)

In general, the methods employed by corrupt actors at the local level are quite diverse. These range from embezzlement of funds and misuse of budgets and authority to fictitious projects, fabricated reports, fund mark-ups, and more. Due to the lack of definitions provided by ICW for each method in their publications, it is necessary for us to explain several definitions. This is intended to ensure that readers of this article do not become confused by similar or overlapping methods.

Figure 3 illustrates that over the past three years, the most common corrupt method used by offenders has been embezzlement, totaling 232 cases. In Article 372 of the Indonesian Penal Code (KUHP), embezzlement is defined as "the act of taking someone else's property where the possession of the property is in the hands of the perpetrator without illegal action." Alongside embezzlement, another predominant corrupt method over the past four years is fictitious projects, accounting for 302 cases. This term refers to the act of falsifying, executing, or organizing activities with premeditation. Falsification can occur not only during project planning or implementation but also at the conclusion of a project. Over the past four years, there have been 174 cases involving fabricated reports.

The common modus operandi of corruption often involve the abuse of authority and budget misappropriation. Naturally, the former term holds a broader meaning compared to the latter. To

provide clarity, we draw upon theoretical foundations from various experts and administrative law reviews. For instance, according to Efendi and Poernomo (2017), abuse of authority occurs when an institution or its officials utilize their powers with intentions deviating from the original purpose for which those powers were granted. To specify further, abuse of authority occurs when: first, those vested with authority act within the scope of their powers, follow proper procedures and processes, and adhere to legal norms, yet use their powers for different objectives; second, authority is overtly used for purposes other than what is stated in regulations; third, authority users employ their powers for personal or group interests, rather than the public interest. In other words, the term "abuse of authority" emphasizes intentional acts rather than negligence, whereas "budget misappropriation" refers to discrepancies in the use of funds compared to the pre-established plans.




Figure 3. Trend of Corruption Prosecutions by Modus Operandi (Cases)
 Source: Indonesia Corruption Watch (2020; 2021; 2022; 2023)

Interestingly, Figure 3 illustrates a significant rise in cases of budget misappropriation during the Covid-19 pandemic, escalating from 28 cases to 133 cases, and further increasing to 303 cases. Meanwhile, Figure 4 shows that the village fund sector ranks first as the most frequently corrupted sector, with around 330 cases over the last three years. Referring to the explanation by the Ministry of Home Affairs (2020) that there are approximately 83,000 villages in Indonesia (Kusnandar, 2021), it poses a distinct challenge for KPK to effectively coordinate and supervise all village administrations.

Based on these figures, we assess that corruption related to village funds has reached a concerning level due to its consistent increase since the Village Law was first enacted in 2014. Without innovative policy breakthroughs, such as optimizing coordination and supervision through grassroots networks, corruption within the village fund sector is likely to persist, both in terms of the number of cases, suspects, and the magnitude of state losses. An iceberg phenomenon is highly plausible, given the limited resources of KPK and law enforcement agencies to access tens of thousands of villages spread from Sabang to Merauke.

Corruption is also prevalent in the governance sector. Over the past four years, there have been 174 cases. The term "governance" used in ICW's publications (2019, 2020, and 2021) refers to the public policy and bureaucracy processes at the city, district, provincial, and central levels. While KPK (2021) itself identifies 8 sub-sectors within governance that are vulnerable to corruption: first, Regional Budget (Indonesian: Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah/ APBD) Planning; second, procurement of goods and services in specific departments; third, licensing processes; fourth, internal government oversight apparatus management (Indonesian: Aparat Pengawasan Intern Pemerintah/ APIP); fifth, civil servant (Indonesian: Aparatur Sipil Negara/ ASN) management; sixth, local tax and fee management; seventh, local asset management; and the last, village

fund management. Once again, it presents a unique challenge to effectively coordinate and supervise all these sub-sectors within the governments of 34 provinces, 98 cities, 416 districts, and 83,000 villages.

Figure 4 also reveals a relative increase in corruption within the education, health, and social sectors since the Covid-19 pandemic began. Amidst the crisis, aid distributed in these three sectors is susceptible to corruption through various means.

In the education sector, for example, there have been at least 127 cases of corruption over the past four years, spanning from elementary schools to universities, and involving teachers, professors, and even local officials. During the Covid-19 pandemic, corruption in the education sector that drew significant public attention was the corruption of Education Operational Assistance (BOP) funds from the Ministry of Religion, which occurred in Pekalongan (Bernardi, 2021), Pasuruan (Arifin, 2022), and other areas, where funds were misappropriated by certain teachers and professors. Additionally, more "traditional" corruption cases in the education sector, such as the misuse of School Operational Assistance (BOS) funds, school infrastructure development, and procurement of goods/services for students, continue to occur.




Figure 4. Trend of corruption prosecutions by sector (Cases)
Source: Indonesia Corruption Watch (2020; 2021; 2022; 2023)

Within the health sector, the most common corrupt practices involve budget inflation (mark-up) and budget misappropriation. These are related to the procurement processes of medical equipment and medications within the Health Department and Regional General Hospitals. One notable corruption case in the health sector that gained public attention was the corruption in the procurement of medical equipment for the Provincial Government of Banten and the South Tangerang City Government in 2012 (Abdi, 2019).

Lastly, the social sector has also caught attention of many. During the Covid-19 pandemic, social aid aimed to alleviate the burdens of individuals and communities impacted socially and economically. However, the large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) imposed by the government led to an increase in the number of people living in poverty. The Central Statistics Agency (BPS) noted that in September 2020, the percentage of the population living in poverty was 10.19 percent, or about 27.5 million people. Compared to September 2019 (pre-pandemic), this percentage increased by 0.97 percent, or 2.75 million people (BPS, 2021). The government introduced various social safety net schemes, including: first, a subsidized food card with IDR 200,000; second, direct cash assistance (Indonesian: Bantuan Langsung Tunai/ BLT); third, internet subsidies for students and educators; fourth, electricity discounts and minimum cost fee assistance; fifth, pre-employment cards and wage subsidies; sixth, food aid packages; seventh, direct cash assistance for Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprises (Indonesian: Usaha Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah/ UMKM); and lastly, exemption of value-added tax (VAT). The implementation of these schemes has led to a reduction in the percentage of the population living in poverty to 9.71 percent, or about 26.5

million people, as of September 2022 (BPS, 2021). However, the process of distributing social aid is highly vulnerable to corruption through various means, ranging from common practices like illicit fees and budget deductions to mark-ups and mark-downs, which involve compromising the quality of social aid to pocket the price difference.

Based on our explanations above, we propose that the coordination and supervision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) at the regional level prioritize two efforts: first, optimizing the role of Satgas Wilayah as units for coordinating and supervising anti-corruption efforts at the local level; and second, maximizing the functions of KPK's MCP and JAGA applications.

The first priority is to optimize the role of Satgas Wilayah as units for coordinating and supervising anti-corruption efforts at the local level. The existence of Satgas Wilayah represents a tangible form of informal coordination in corruption eradication in Indonesia. These task forces should be staffed with individuals who possess competence, dedication, and a high level of commitment to anti-corruption efforts in the region. Competence can be developed through training activities, reinforcement, or simulated enforcement. Meanwhile, dedication and commitment can be nurtured through the institutional culture within KPK itself. Satgas Wilayah should also be capable of enhancing the performance effectiveness of local governments with an orientation and priority towards activities that seek solutions to issues encountered in the field, as well as consistent mentoring to both civil servants and state civil apparatuses in the region. Solutions stem from supervisory activities, research, and reviews conducted by Satgas Wilayah.

One crucial aspect of coordination is leadership. Therefore, each leader of Satgas Wilayah must have a clear leadership vision in combating corruption. Most importantly, the leader should be able to translate KPK's vision, mission, and programs to their team members and other involved institutions in anti-corruption efforts at the local level, thus establishing mechanisms for informal coordination. Based on best practices in South American countries, when formal coordination stagnates, the political will and common goals of institutional leaders become driving factors for informal coordination (Davis et al., 2021).

We also see that Satgas Wilayah should have a clear mandate, authority, and responsibility. So far, at the policy coordination level, apart from KPK Regulation No. 7 of 2020, there is still Presidential Regulation No. 102 of 2020 regarding the Implementation of KPK Supervision, which can provide a strong foundation for the mandate, authority, and responsibility of Satgas Wilayah, especially regarding coordination and supervision with Regional Police, District Attorney's Offices, and High Attorney's Offices. The next task is to formulate mechanisms and technical instruments for KPK's coordination with local governments, and even with village governments if necessary.

In KPK Regulation No. 7 of 2020, it is stated that Satgas Wilayah fall under the Directorate of Regions (Article 63), and in the future, one Satgas Wilayah will be established for each province, except for the DKI Jakarta region, which may have 3 Task Forces. These task forces will be filled with functional positions (Article 64). So far, KPK has had 9 Regional Coordinators (KPK, 2019). Referring to the explanation in KPK Regulation No. 7 of 2020, this regional coordinator (Indonesian: Koordinator Wilayah/ Korwil) model will be changed to Satgas Wilayah model, each spread across the provinces. Unlike the current task division (KPK, 2022: 198), we propose that the division of the five directorates under the deputy for coordination and supervision can be done as follows: Directorate I: West Java and Sumatra; Directorate II: DI Yogyakarta, Central Java, and Kalimantan; Directorate III: Banten, DKI Jakarta, Bali, Nusa Tenggara Barat and Nusa Tenggara Timur; Directorate IV: East Java and Sulawesi; Directorate V: Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, and West Papua.

This division is more based on the geographical distribution of corruption cases over the past four years (see Table 1). It is expected that each Directorate will have a relatively even workload, enabling effective coordination to take place.

In the same regulation, it is also explained that the main tasks of Satgas Wilayah are twofold: first, to coordinate with local governments; and second, to supervise the performance of the special criminal investigation directorate in regional police (Indonesian: Kepolisian Daerah/ Polda) and the working units in district and high attorneys' offices. In carrying out these tasks,

Satgas Wilayah execute at least the functions stipulated in Article 61 Paragraph (2), ranging from formulating guidelines, conducting studies/evaluations, convening case hearings, making recommendations for case takeover, etc.

The second priority is to optimize the MCP and JAGA app. Theoretically, coordination and supervision can be enhanced through technology. In this context, we emphasize the importance of Regional Task Forces coordinating with local governments, both at the city/district and provincial levels, regarding the use of the Monitoring Center for Prevention (MCP) application, as well as coordinating with local anti-corruption activist groups regarding the use of the JAGA (Corruption Prevention Network) application.

Table 1. Trend of Corruption Prosecutions by Regions

Order	2019	2020	2021	2022
1	Jawa Barat	Jawa Timur	Jawa Timur NTT	Jawa Timur
2	Jawa Timur	Jawa Tengah	Maluku	Jawa Barat
3	NTB	Jawa Barat	Jawa Barat	NTT
4	Jawa Tengah	Sumatera Utara	Sulawesi Tengah Sulawesi Utara	Aceh Sumatera Selatan
5	Aceh Sulawesi Selatan Jambi	Sulawesi Selatan	Sulawesi Selatan	Riau Bengkulu
6	Lampung Bengkulu	Aceh	Bali	Sumatera Utara Kalimantan Barat
7	Sulawesi Tengah Sumatera Barat Bali	Riau	Jawa Tengah	
8	Sumatera Utara Papua Barat	Bengkulu	Kalimantan Barat	

Source: *Indonesia Corruption Watch (2020; 2021; 2022; 2023)*

The MCP application, first launched in 2019, has been utilized to assess the success rate of local governments (Indonesian: Pemerintah Daerah/Pemda) in improving 8 government sectors vulnerable to corruption. With this application, local governments can more easily compile monitoring reports. They simply need to fill out reports by uploading achievement data along with supporting evidence. Following this, KPK verifies the alignment between the evidence and criteria, and evaluates the achievements.

However, it should be emphasized that the MCP score cannot be used as a measure of whether an area is prone to corruption or not. This score merely indicates the extent of compliance of Pemda with their own governance action plans. A high MCP score does not necessarily signify a corruption-free area, nor does a low MCP score definitively indicate a highly corrupt area. Nonetheless, the MCP score can affirm whether an area has a high or low commitment to anti-corruption efforts. It can also reflect the quality of human resources and bureaucracy in the region. A region characterized by low MCP score ratings is expected to possess human resources of substandard quality and bureaucratic structures that are not efficient.

After comparing the results of MCP in 2019 and 2020, several interesting findings arise. First, the MCP scores for Papua and West Papua did not experience significant improvement, unlike Aceh and East Nusa Tenggara. The first two provinces still fall into the category of having the lowest MCP scores. Second, the MCP scores for Central Sulawesi and East Kalimantan actually fell below 60 percent (KPK, 2020: 50) compared to the previous year. Mentoring for civil servants and state civil apparatus in these areas should be a key agenda for coordination and supervision by the Regional Task Forces in the future.

Apart from the MCP application, KPK also introduced the JAGA app in 2016. While the MCP app is targeted at civil servants and ASN in Pemda, the JAGA app is aimed at the general public. With this application, it is hoped that the level of public participation in monitoring, proposing, and reporting corruption will increase. The JAGA app is also supported by the existence of a public information portal called the Indonesian Corruption Prevention Network or JAGA.ID, launched in

2017. The JAGA app has undergone development. In 2017, it included features such as Jaga Education, Jaga Health, Jaga Licensing, and Jaga Village. In 2019, users could access various information related to corruption prevention, local government governance, officials' wealth reports (Indonesian: Laporan Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara/ LHKPN), corruption case developments, and participate in discussions. Lastly, in 2020, KPK further developed the JAGA Bansos (social assistance) feature.

In practice, KPK's coordination with Pemda can be optimized through these applications, as KPK can simply relay complaints, reports, or even public aspirations to the local governments. We refer to a case study of social assistance distribution in Depok City during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. One JAGA user reported their complaint through the JAGA Bansos feature regarding unfair distribution. While nearly all of their neighbors received both cash and staple food assistance, this user only received staple food. Shortly after, the user was contacted by the Depok City Social Affairs Office, providing an explanation that those who had received assistance from one source would not receive assistance from another. A similar case occurred in Subang City, where a JAGA user felt social jealousy as their neighbors received cash assistance while they only received staple food. After reporting this complaint through the JAGA Bansos feature, the Subang City Social Affairs Office visited the user two weeks later, explaining that their name was not registered as a recipient from both the central and local governments, only at the provincial level.

The criticism is that there is currently no transparency in the data published by KPK regarding public participation rates in other JAGA features, or case studies similar to those in the JAGA Bansos feature. Even if there are such cases, they are limited in number, and best practices in one area have not yet been adapted to other areas. We take the example of public and women's participation in supervising village funds. In the 2019 Annual Report, KPK claimed an increase in grassroots efforts to oversee village funds, yet at the same time, corruption cases related to village funds have been on the rise in the past 3 years. Another weakness of the JAGA application is the low level of public participation. By October 2023, the number of downloads for this application on the Google Play Store is only slightly above 100,000 users. Assuming Indonesia's population is around 270 million, the ratio of downloads is only 0.00037 percent. We encourage Satgas Wilayah to more actively promote the JAGA app to the general public in their outreach activities.

Continuing within the context of using technology to promote anti-corruption efforts at the local level, one future challenge is to harmonize and integrate KPK's JAGA application with similar anti-corruption applications. This could lead to the creation of a sort of anti-corruption data bank in Indonesia, containing reports and feedback from the public. In 2020, the Attorney General's Office, in collaboration with the Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration (Indonesian: Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal dan Transmigrasi/ PDTT), released the Jaga Desa application. The purpose was to optimize supervision and use of village funds in over 70,000 villages in Indonesia. The features in this application are similar to those in KPK's JAGA application, where village government officials can consult and receive guidance from the PDTT Ministry and the Attorney General's Office. A year later, the South Sulawesi Regional Police launched the Lapor Korupsi application (Hasanuddin, 2021). The function of this application is not significantly different from the applications developed by KPK and the Attorney General's Office, as it serves as a platform for the public to report instances of corruption or indications of corruption in their surroundings.

Given the broad scope of these three applications, we propose the integration of the JAGA, Jaga Desa, and Lapor Korupsi applications into one system, with a priority focus on preventing corruption in village fund management. After all, one way to optimize KPK's coordination with local governments is by prioritizing issue/case handling. Additionally, corruption prevention at the village level is crucial as it operates as a "bottom-up" movement. If effective anti-corruption efforts are established in villages throughout Indonesia, the positive impact could extend to higher levels of administration - cities, districts, and provinces.

KPK Coordination with Prosecution's Office and Police

The Law No. 19 of 2019 has mandated KPK to carry out coordination and supervision with various agencies. The tasks and authorities for this coordination and supervision are outlined in

several articles. For instance, Article 6 letter B emphasizes that coordination tasks are to be carried out by KPK with the police and the attorney's office, as well as with ministries/agencies involved in public services. Similarly, Article 6 letter D clarifies that supervision tasks are solely carried out by KPK with the police and the attorney's office. In conducting coordination, KPK possesses authorities, as specified in Article 8, including: first, coordinating investigation, prosecution, and trial activities; second, establishing reporting systems; third, requesting information; fourth, conducting hearings or meetings; and finally, requesting reports concerning corruption prevention efforts. Furthermore, the authorities for supervision are defined in Article 10, where KPK is authorized to: first, conduct oversight, research, or reviews; and second, formulate technical and operational provisions and guidelines related to supervision tasks with a Presidential Regulation, in this case, Presidential Regulation No. 102 of 2020.

Under Article 10A, the supervision of case takeover from the police and the attorney's office is subject to conditions, such as: first, the investigative/attorney trial process based on public reports is not followed up; second, the process is unfinished or delayed without justifiable reasons; third, the process is aimed at protecting the actual perpetrators of corruption; fourth, the process involves non-corruption elements; fifth, the process experiences intervention from authorities in the executive, judicial, and legislative sectors; sixth, other conditions deemed by the police or the attorney's office as making the handling of corruption cases difficult and unjustifiable.

In addition, the implementation of coordination and supervision by KPK is also regulated in Presidential Regulation No. 102 of 2020. For instance, Article 5 outlines three types of supervision activities: oversight, research, and reviews. Oversight activities pertain to monitoring the handling process of corruption cases by the police and the attorney's office, involving requesting chronological reports, progress reports, and conducting case discussions (Article 6 paragraph 2). On the other hand, research activities encompass gathering, processing, analyzing, and presenting data systematically and objectively to identify obstacles or challenges faced by the police and the attorney's office (Article 7 paragraph 1). In the context of research, KPK is authorized to provide guidance to the police and the attorney's office and conduct joint case discussions (Article 7 paragraph 2). Lastly, reviews are aimed at examining the results of research and oversight to determine mandatory recommendations, suggestions, and decision-making measures to expedite the handling of corruption cases (Article 8 paragraph 1). While in the context of reviews, KPK is also authorized to conduct joint case discussions.

Based on this Presidential Regulation, we see that the competency of analysis and joint case discussions by KPK investigators will significantly determine the effectiveness of supervision implementation. In other words, the success of supervision in the field depends on the quality of human resources in KPK, especially in providing solutions to Regional Police (Polda) and High Attorney's Offices (Kejati) for cases facing hindrances.

The last regulation that serves as a foundation for the implementation of coordination and supervision by KPK is Regulation No. 7 of 2020. In Chapter VII of this regulation, the Deputy for Coordination and Supervision's role is specifically explained. Article 61 paragraph (1) asserts that the Deputy's task is to prepare formulations and execute technical policies in the field of coordination and supervision of corruption crime eradication. Furthermore, Article 61 paragraph (2) outlines the Deputy's ten functions, including: first, formulating technical policies regarding coordination with regional governments; second, formulating technical policies for coordination and supervision of police and attorney's office performance; third, conducting studies, research, and/or analysis; fourth, coordinating jointly with the police and the attorney's office; fifth, requesting information and progress reports, and establishing reporting systems with the police and attorney's office; sixth, conducting joint case discussions; seventh, conducting oversight, research, and reviews of case handling; eighth, recommending to the Chair of KPK the takeover of cases at the investigation/prosecution stage; ninth, conducting coordination, synchronization, monitoring, evaluation, and implementing working relationships among units; and finally, performing other tasks within their expertise.

Coordination between KPK as the coordinating/supervising institution who leads corruption eradication efforts and the police and the attorney's office is essential. This is not only because the

police and the attorney's office are the main institutions traditionally vested with the authority to investigate (conduct preliminary and full investigations). Particularly for the attorney's office, it has the authority to prosecute and implement legal decisions.

Based on statistical data in the last 8 years, it is evident that the accumulation of cases handled by the attorney's office far exceeds those handled by KPK. During 2015 to 2022, KPK handled around 311 cases. In comparison, the attorney's office handled around 3,012 cases. Similarly, considering the accumulation of state losses, from the 311 cases handled by KPK, there is a potential return of state losses amounting to IDR 11,295 billion. Meanwhile, from the 3,012 cases handled by the attorney's office, the potential return of state losses reached IDR 95,524 billion.

Table 2. Performance trends of Attorney's Office, Police, and KPK based on the number of their cases

Institution	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
KPK	30	35	44	57	62	15	32	36
Police	151	140	216	162	100	170	130	138
Attorney's Office	369	949	315	235	109	259	371	405

Source: *Indonesia Corruption Watch (2020, 2021, 2022, 2023)*

The reverse situation occurs between KPK and the police. During 2015 to 2022, the Indonesian National Police (Indonesian: Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia/ Polri) handled around 1,207 cases. In terms of the accumulation of state losses as well, the potential recovery of state losses these cases handled by the police amounted to only IDR 8,647 billion, which is less than that of KPK. The outcomes of this coordination are subject to criticism, given that the police have infrastructure and human resources distributed throughout Indonesia, even down to the city/district level.

Table 3. Performance trends of Attorney's Office, Police, and KPK based on state losses (Billion)

Institution	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
KPK	723	164	210	385	6,200	805	596	2,212
Police	1,100	337	1,600	425	1,356	219	2,310	1,327
Attorney's Office	1,200	949	4,400	4,800	847	17,590	26,531	39,207

Source: *Indonesia Corruption Watch (2020, 2021, 2022, 2023)*

Based the conditions above, we propose that the implementation of coordination and supervision be prioritized on the following three issues: first, optimizing the use of the e-SPDP application; second, harmonizing the issuance of SP3 (Indonesian: Surat Perintah Penghentian Penyidikan, English: Order to Terminate Investigation); and third, optimizing the activities of oversight, research, and assessment of needs within the internal structures of KPK, the police, and the prosecution. Generally, coordination activities should be conducted within clear timelines and supported by technology-based systems, rather than being based on case-by-case scenarios as has been done so far (KPK, 2019). Coordination could be carried out on a weekly basis, enabling the identification of progress and bottlenecks in each case and finding immediate solutions.

Regarding the first priority of optimizing the use of the e-SPDP application, KPK has previously developed the e-SPDP application to streamline the coordination of corruption cases between the police and the prosecution. We note that in March 2017, the Chairman of KPK, the Chief of Police, and the Attorney General signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the eradication of corruption. In essence, formal coordination at the strategic level has existed for a long time.

The mechanism of e-SPDP has been designed to be simple. During the initial stages of investigating corruption cases, investigators can upload the e-SPDP into the system. This allows investigators from other agencies and public attorneys to directly access the information. Before the introduction of e-SPDP, investigators from the prosecution and the police would inform KPK by sending hard copies of the SPDP. However, in practice, many investigators from the prosecution and the police at the regional level are not yet familiar with and do not fully understand the e-SPDP application (Ridwan, 2021); (Putri, 2019). Later, in a hearing at the Constitutional Court (2023), KPK leadership estimated that e-SPDP is only being utilized at a rate of 70-80 percent. Therefore, awareness and familiarity with this application should be raised

through the efforts of regional task forces, reaching investigators and public attorneys at the regional level, ensuring a consistent understanding of the importance of e-SPDP in promoting coordination effectiveness. In addition to awareness campaigns, the habitual use of e-SPDP could be established through non-formal coordination, such as routine meetings between regional task forces and investigators at the provincial and district levels, as well as informal guidance from the leaders of their respective agencies regarding the use of e-SPDP, etc. We also propose the option of mandating the use of e-SPDP.

The second priority is to harmonize the issuance of SP3. The authority of KPK to issue SP3 (Order to Terminate Investigation) is regulated by Article 40 of KPK Law. This is permissible if a corruption case has not been investigated and prosecuted for a period of 2 years. Recently, this authority has sparked controversy in the public domain. Opponents of this authority are concerned that KPK might become susceptible to external political influences due to its power to halt investigations (Mulyana, 2021). In the worst-case scenario, there are fears that KPK might discontinue the handling of major cases (Taher, 2019).

We agree that KPK should have authorization to issue SP3. In practice, SP3 can provide a way out of stalled processes within KPK, especially when investigations and prosecutions can be time-consuming and uncertain. From the perspective of interagency coordination theory, the overlapping issuance of SP3 for corruption cases can be improved. Looking ahead, we see that the police and the prosecution do not need to issue SP3 for corruption cases. It would be better if cases recommended for SP3 are directly handed over to KPK, subject to the conditions outlined in Article 10A Paragraph (2) of KPK Law. After the transfer, KPK can conduct a re-investigation of the case. If the evidence is insufficient or other reasons arise, KPK can ultimately issue an SP3 for the case. Another important aspect of the SP3 issuance process at KPK is transparency to the public. According to Tirto (2021), data regarding SP3 for corruption cases has been inadequately disclosed. While the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) did release data on SP3 cases handled by the police and the attorney, it covered a long period. The prosecution did issue SP3 for 17 cases from 2001-2004. Information on the issuance of SP3 for corruption cases by the police is even more challenging to find. If the issuance of SP3 for corruption cases is consolidated within KPK, it is hoped that transparency and accountability aspects can be enhanced.

The last priority is optimizing the activities of oversight, research, and assessment of needs within the internal structures of KPK, the police, and the prosecution. Referring to the provisions of Presidential Regulation No. 102/2020, coordination and supervision activities are focused on oversight, research, and assessment. We note that comprehensive studies regarding the needs of KPK, the police, and the prosecution at the regional level are relatively scarce. Yet, these studies are essential for mapping out the specific needs of each agency, with the aim of improving the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts at the regional level. For instance, an in-depth study is required to assess the necessity of establishing a Directorate for Corruption Criminal Investigations, separate from the Directorate for Special Criminal Investigations within the Regional Police (Polda). This also applies to the establishment of an Assistant for Corruption Criminal Affairs at the level of the High Prosecution Office (Indonesian: Kejaksaan Tinggi/ Kejati), which would be distinct from the Assistant for Special Criminal Affairs, as stipulated in the Attorney General Regulation No. Per-006/A/JA/07/2017. Regardless, from a theoretical standpoint, specialization could enhance coordination effectiveness in the field, particularly since the performance of the police and prosecution in handling corruption cases at the regional level has been less effective, as evidenced by the current organizational model of Polda and Kejati. Additionally, it is necessary to research and analyze the specific competencies required by investigators from the Regional Police, District Prosecution Offices, and High Prosecution Offices, especially given the many ongoing corruption cases at the regional level. These three activities cannot be conducted without high-quality data, transparency in sharing data with the public, and public participation.

Conclusion

Our discussion revolves around the bigger theme of optimizing coordination and supervision between KPK, local governments, the Police and the Prosecution in Indonesia. We find that there are provinces, namely Papua and West Papua, that have not experienced significant improvements in their Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores. The CPI score should serve as the primary parameter to determine whether KPK is effectively fulfilling its coordination functions with local governments. Additionally, there are other anti-corruption applications being developed by various central and regional agencies. The existence of these applications needs to be carefully evaluated in terms of their alignment with the anti-corruption spirit, as their motives might be more oriented towards wasteful use of state budget. As the coordinator in the anti-corruption effort, KPK should assertively encourage both central and regional agencies to focus on the development and utilization of the "JAGA" app in the regions.

Regarding the tasks and authority of coordination and supervision held by KPK in relation to the Police and the Prosecution, we found that the utilization of the e-SPDP is still low, and the process of issuing SP3 has not yet been harmonized. Furthermore, it is essential for KPK to possess a credible, valid, and transparent database. This database serves to enhance the quality of supervision (oversight, assessment, and review), providing a foundation for prompt and accurate decision-making at the operational level. Furthermore, the availability, accuracy, and accessibility of data enable public participation in the fight against corruption.

In terms of data, many findings were encountered during the data collection process, which could be a collective reflection. Our hypothesis is that corruption numbers in Indonesia continue to rise due to the relatively underdeveloped state of anti-corruption studies, which might be exclusive to certain disciplines. This viewpoint is rooted in the observation that stakeholders in the anti-corruption field in Indonesia struggle to provide comprehensive baseline data, including transparent and consistent information related to statistics and case studies in their publications. KPK's inconsistency in publishing CPI scores, for example, by either providing detailed data and explanations per deputy or omitting them, was noted. A significant critique we have is directed towards KPK, since the 2021 annual report the agency seems to prioritize visual and audiovisual presentations over substantive content in its reports. Additionally, inconsistencies were identified in the Indonesian Corruption Watch's (ICW) methodology for defining modes, types, and cases of corruption. Even the prosecution and the police have been very hesitant about releasing statistics on SP3 cases. It is important to acknowledge that the study of corruption involves a multidisciplinary approach, and the effort to combat corruption spans multiple sectors. Our hope is that our findings can contribute to the considerations of policymakers.

Reccomendation

1. The Deputy of Coordination and Supervision formulates technical guidelines for coordination and supervision with local governments, and facilitates the harmonization of applications related to anti-corruption efforts.
2. The Directorate of Regions involves civil society, particularly anti-corruption activists with comprehensive track records and a collaborative vision, as well as anti-corruption study centers within their respective working regions, to train and enhance the competencies of Satgas Wilayah members.
3. Satgas Wilayah work towards harmonizing the Anti-Corruption units established by local governments, regional police (polda), and district attorneys (kejati).
4. The KPK conducts an evaluation of the substance of its annual reports. The reports from each Deputy need to be presented to the public in a detailed and comprehensive manner. This is especially important for providing concise descriptions of specific case studies and statistical data on prevention and enforcement efforts.

Acknowledgement

We would like to express our gratitude to the individuals, groups, units, or divisions within the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) who have diligently compiled the KPK Annual Reports

year after year. Additionally, we extend our thanks to Mr. Wana Alamsyah, a researcher at ICW, and the Legal and Judicial Monitoring Division of ICW, for their efforts in assembling the Corruption Enforcement Trends Monitoring Report. The majority of the input and critiques presented in this article are rooted in the data published by them.

References

- Alamsyah, W. (2021). Kinerja penindakan kasus korupsi 2020. *Indonesia Corruption Watch*. Jakarta: ICW
- Abdi, A., P. (2019). *Wawan didakwa korupsi alat kesehatan dan rugikan negara Rp94,2 M*. Retrieved from <https://tirto.id/wawan-didakwa-korupsi-alat-kesehatan-dan-rugikan-negara-rp942-m-ekTm>
- Arifin, M. (2022). *Sembilan orang jadi tersangka korupsi dana BOP Kabupaten Pasuruan Rp 3,1 M*. Retrieved from <https://www.detik.com/jatim/hukum-dan-kriminal/d-5988763/sembilan-orang-jadi-tersangka-korupsi-dana-bop-kabupaten-pasuruan-rp-31-m>
- Attorney General Regulation No. Per-006/A/JA/07/2017 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia
- Bernardi, R. (2021). *Kasus korupsi bantuan Corona madrasah di Pekalongan, 7 orang jadi tersangka*. Retrieved from <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-5762617/kasus-korupsi-bantuan-corona-madrasah-di-pekalongan-7-orang-jadi-tersangka>
- Bouckaert, G., Peters, B. G., & Verhoest, K. (2010). *The coordination of public sector organizations: Shifting patterns of public management*. Berlin: Springer. 14–19
- BPS. (2021). *Persentase penduduk miskin September 2020 naik menjadi 10,19 persen*. Retrieved from <https://www.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2021/02/15/1851/persentase-penduduk-miskin-september-2020-naik-menjadi-10-19-persen.html>
- BPS. (2022). *Persentase penduduk miskin September 2021 turun menjadi 9,71 persen*. Retrieved from <https://www.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2022/01/17/1929/persentase-penduduk-miskin-september-2021-turun-menjadi-9-71-persen.html>
- Braun, D. (2008). Organising the political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies. *Science and Public Policy*, 35(4). 227-239. <https://doi.org/10.3152/030234208X287056>
- Choi, J., W. (2014). Measuring the performance of an anticorruption agency: The case of KPK in Indonesia. *International Review of Public Administration*, 16(3). 45-63
- Davis, L., Jorge, G., & Machado, M. (2021). *Coordinating the enforcement of anti-corruption law: South American experiences*. In WCL 54
- Efendi, A., & Poernomo, F. (2017). *Hukum administrasi*. Jakarta: Sinar Grafika
- Erdianto, K. (2019). *KPK punya kewenangan menerbitkan SP3 dengan jangka waktu 2 tahun*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/09/17/18585661/kpk-punya-kewenangan-menerbitkan-sp3-dengan-jangka-waktu-2-tahun>
- Freeman, J., & Rossi, J. (2012). Improving coordination of related agency responsibilities. *Proceedings of the Administrative Conference of the United States 2012*. <https://www.acus.gov/report/consultants-report-improving-coordination-related-agency-responsibilities>
- Hasanuddin, M. (2021). *Polda Sulsel luncurkan "Lapor Korupsi" minimalisir praktik KKN*. Retrieved from <https://makassar.antaranews.com/berita/307501/polda-sulsel-luncurkan-lapor-korupsi-minimalisir-praktik-kkn>
- Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(4). 725-740. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704040472>

- ICW. (2020). *Tren penindakan korupsi 2019*. Jakarta: ICW
- ICW. (2022). *Laporan hasil pemantauan tren penindakan korupsi tahun 2021*. Jakarta: ICW
- ICW. (2023). *Laporan hasil pemantauan tren penindakan korupsi tahun 2022*. Jakarta: ICW.
- Kejaksaan RI. (2019). Jaga Desa. Retrieved from <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.annahdah.jagadesa&hl=in&gl=US>
- Kusnandar, V., B. (2021). *Berapa jumlah desa/kelurahan di Indonesia?*. Retrieved from <https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2021/11/22/berapa-jumlah-desakelurahan-di-indonesia>
- KPK. (2016). *JAGA: Jaringan Pencegahan Korupsi*. Retrieved from <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=id.or.checkmy&hl=in&gl=US>
- KPK. (2019). *Laporan tahunan KPK 2019*. Jakarta: KPK
- KPK. (2019). Kedeputan penindakan. *Lampiran Lampiran Laporan Tahunan KPK 2019*
- KPK. (2020). *Laporan tahunan KPK 2020*. Jakarta: KPK
- KPK. (2020). Kedeputan penindakan. *Lampiran Lampiran Laporan Tahunan KPK 2020*
- KPK. (2021). *Laporan tahunan KPK 2021*. Jakarta: KPK
- KPK. (2022). *Laporan tahunan KPK 2021*. Jakarta: KPK
- KPK Regulation No. 7 of 2020 tentang Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi
- Law No. 19 of 2019 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi
- Mahkamah Konstitusi. (2023). Acara mendengarkan keterangan Kepolisian RI dan KPK. *Risalah Sidang Perkara Nomor 28/PUU-XXI/2023 Perihal Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2004 Tentang Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Dan Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 Tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Terhadap Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945*. Jakarta: Mahkamah Konstitusi
- Mahkamah Konstitusi. (2023). Acara mendengarkan keterangan ahli pemohon (VII). *Risalah Sidang Perkara Nomor 28/PUU-XXI/2023 Perihal Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2004 Tentang Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 Tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Dan Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 Tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Terhadap Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945*. Jakarta: Mahkamah Konstitusi
- Mietzner, M. (2015). Dysfunction by design: Political finance and corruption in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 47(4). 587-610. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2015.1079991>
- Mulyana, C. (2021). *MK perkuat SP3 KPK, kasus yang mangkrak 2 tahun sejak SPDP terbit*. Retrieved from <https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/406278/mk-perkuat-sp3-kpk-kasus-yang-mangkrak-2-tahun-sejak-spdp-terbit>
- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2015). *Prevention of corruption in the public sector in Eastern Europe and Central Asia*
- Peters, B., G. (2018). The challenge of policy coordination. *Policy Design and Practice*, 1(1). 1-11. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2018.1437946>
- Presidential Regulation No. 102 of 2020 tentang Pelaksanaan Supervisi Tindak Pidana Korupsi
- Putri, Z. (2019). *Ketua KPK minta Kapolri dan Jaksa Agung efektifkan e-SPDP*. Retrieved from <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4782766/ketua-kpk-minta-kapolri-dan-jaksa-agung-efektifkan-e-spdp>
- Rahmat, D. (2020). Formulasi kebijakan pidana denda dan uang pengganti dalam penegakan tindak pidana korupsi di Indonesia. *Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan*, 8(1). 79-88. <https://doi.org/10.29303/ius.v8i1.686>

- Razzano, G. (2016). Connecting the dots: Coordination challenge for the open governance partnership in South Africa. *Open Democracy Advice Centre*.
- Ridwan, M. (2021). KPK ingin APH samakan persepsi dalam mengusut kasus korupsi. Retrieved from <https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/11/11/2021/kpk-ingin-aph-samakan-persepsi-dalam-mengusut-kasus-korupsi/>
- Sampford, C., Smith, R., & Brown, A. J. (2005). From greek temple to bird's nest: Towards a theory of coherence and mutual accountability for national integrity systems. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 64(2). 96-108. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.2005.00445.x>
- Taher, A., P. (2019). *Wewenang SP3 KPK: antara kepastian hukum dan komoditas politik*. Retrieved from <https://tirto.id/wewenang-sp3-kpk-antara-kepastian-hukum-dan-komoditas-politik-eilp>