

# The prevention of political corruption and implementation of the Political Party Integrity System in Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa

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**Abstract:** This paper focuses on examining the institutionalisation of the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP) which was pushed by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as part of efforts to prevent political corruption in the National Awakening Party (PKB). Since the 2009, 2014 and 2019 elections, PKB's voter share has increased. The number of party cadres who have been caught in corruption cases is relatively small compared to other parties. The main question to be answered is how the institutionalisation of the SIPP in the PKB was initiated by the KPK as part of efforts to prevent political corruption? The theoretical framework used is O'Donnell's institutionalisation theory. There are two stages of institutionalisation; the spread of values (value infusion) and routine actions against these values (behavioural routinisation). Data was collected through literature review and interviews. This research shows that the institutionalisation of the SIPP in the PKB took place through the stage of spreading SIPP values. This distribution is detailed in Mabda' Siyasi, AD/ART, the PKB Manifesto, and Party Regulations. It regulates the code of ethics, regeneration and recruitment, internal democratisation, and financial governance required within the PKB; the goal being that the PKB would become used to these internal provisions when carrying out party activities. The PKB is one of the parties that welcomes the existence of the SIPP. For the PKB, the SIPP is a means of accelerating the strengthening of party integrity. It has become a concrete step in preventing political corruption involving party cadres.

**Keywords:** political corruption; integrity; political parties; institutionalisation.

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## Introduction

Political corruption is a threat, not only to governance but to all dimensions of life. Political corruption has a significant impact on the quality of democratic institutions, such as political parties, elections, and parliament (Sukmajati, 2018). In the study of political science, for example by Johnston (2005), political corruption is defined as the abuse of power, authority, and influence by political actors. The goal is to gain personal and group benefits. Political corruption will result in low public trust in political parties (Kunichova, 2009). Internally, political corruption has implications for the strength of the party system. The institutionalisation of the party system is one of the key factors in a democratic political system (Mainwaring, 2018). Therefore, the prevention of political corruption must be carried out in a systemic and structured manner. In Indonesia's political experience, one such manner is the implementation of the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP), which was initiated by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2013.

Within political science scholarship, political corruption takes many diverse forms. (Sukmajati, 2018) quotes Gibbons and Rowat (1976) when explaining seven forms of political corruption: patronage, vote buying, pork barrel policies, bribes, conflicts of interest, corruption funding and influence peddling. In the view of Hutchcroft (1997), political corruption takes three forms: rent, licensing corruption, and clientelism. Rent is the practice of seeking profits from political capital that has been issued. Usually, it involves political actors and businessmen. This affects the second form, the regulation of licensing to benefit certain parties. The third form occurs when the patron

occupies a public position, using it for the benefit of their client network and making power resources to perpetuate the patron-client relationship.

The diversity of forms of political corruption, according to Heywood (2015), is caused by complex factors. To simplify it, it can be categorised into three factors. First, cultural factors, where the culture of society still considers corruption as a normal thing. Here, the society tolerates corrupt practices, which are sometimes even considered part of the social balance. Second, the structural factor, in which the nature of the country's development has an excess of open space for corruption. In this context, the character of state institutions and governance are the main variables, including patron-client relations and state intervention in various domains. Third, institutional factors. These factors are related to the decreasing influence of representative organisations, such as political parties and trade unions, coupled with regionalisation and decentralisation, which broaden the area of power. This includes the level of institutionalisation of political parties.

This study intends to examine the prevention of political corruption in Indonesia, especially in political parties. The focus of this study is the institutionalisation of the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP) in the National Awakening Party (PKB), which was initiated by the KPK. First, the study will examine the achievements and challenges of institutionalising the SIPP in the PKB from 2019-2021. Second, it will discuss how the institutionalisation of (SIPP) was responded to by the PKB.

Since 2013, the Directorate of Education and the Community Services Deputy for Prevention of Corruption in the KPK have conducted in-depth studies of political systems and parties. In 2016-2017, one study focused on formulating a Political Party Integrity System (SIPP). SIPP is a set of policies developed by political parties and agreed upon collectively as a standard of integrity that must be obeyed by all party cadres. With this SIPP, the KPK intended to encourage the strengthening of political party institutions, one result of which is to the prevention of political corruption. SIPP implementation is a guide to realising four things, (1) Produce prospective leaders with integrity; (2) Minimising the risk of political corruption and abuse of power; (3) Become an instrument of compliance with the political party integrity system, and (4) Realising transparent and accountable financial governance.

SIPP, which began to be implemented in 2018, was an important step for strengthening political parties and democracy. These four things are strategies for preventing political corruption involving cadres and political elites.

Based on 2017 data, Transparency International Indonesia published the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Four of the nine composite indices of corruption related to political parties and departments, including the People's Representative Council of the DPR (54 percent), the bureaucracy (50 percent), the DPRD Regional People's Representative Council (47 percent), and ministries (32 percent). Based on this data, the DPR is perceived as the most corrupt institution in Indonesia. This public perception is evidenced by the number of cases handled by the KPK involving DPR political actors of 35.87%. These political actors consisted of members of the DPR, mayors/regents, and governors, all of whom are democratically elected.

The results of a survey conducted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences in 2018 also showed that people still do not trust institutions that have been democratically elected. Political parties are not trusted by the public. The level of confidence in political parties is only 13.1%. Conditions that are not much different are also experienced by public institutions such as the DPR, DPD, Provincial DPRD and Regency DPRD, all of which show a value of public trust of less than 50%. Therefore, the KPK, as a state institution that plays a role in the prevention and prosecution of criminal acts of corruption, continually seeks to take concrete steps to foster integrity within the democratic system in Indonesia. The preparation of the SIPP is the first step for the KPK when preventing political corruption.

There are two reasons why this is important to study. First, the results of the General Election Commission (KPU) recap during the last three elections show that PKB's vote has consistently increased (Kompas, 2019). In the 2009 election, PKB received only 5,146,302 votes (4.95 percent of the total vote). This increased to 11,298,950 (9.04 percent) in the 2014 general election. Although the increase in votes was not as significant as the 2014 election, in the 2019 election, PKB's vote again rose to 13,570,097 (9.69 percent). Although this consistency is not necessarily

the reason that the PKB is a party that has experienced strengthening integrity, it is certainly closely related to cadre militancy and public trust. Although several other parties also experienced increases, they were not consistent. For example, the National Mandate Party (PAN) in the 2009 election won 6.03 percent; in 2014 it increased to 7.55 percent and in 2019 it fell to 6.84 percent. After an internal conflict, which peaked in 2007, the PKB reorganised the party (Saputra, 2019). This effort is correlative with an increase in vote acquisition. Although it cannot be known with certainty that SIPP implementation led to the increase in PKB votes, this research wants to conduct an initial study of how the implementation took shape.

Second, until March 28 2019, the amount of PKB cadres sitting in the DPR who were dealing with the KPK because of corruption cases was relatively small compared to other parties. 24 members of the Golongan Karya party in the DPR have committed corruption, out of a total of 85 members. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) has had 18 out of 128 members commit corruption. In the Democratic Party, there was nine people out of a total of 54. PAN had six people out of 44. Meanwhile, the PKB had only two out of 58 people (IDN Times, 2019) answering to the KPK. Calculated in percentage terms, the cadres who were most commonly caught in corruption up until 2019 were from Golkar (28 percent), PDIP (14 percent), the Democratic Party (16 percent), PAN (13 percent), and the PKB (three percent). These two considerations show that in the last ten years (2009-2019), the PKB has been quite successful in improving their anti-corruption systems.

### Methods

This study uses a qualitative method, while the approach used is new institutionalism. The author addresses the two issues above by defining political parties and the KPK as institutions that use the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP) to prevent political corruption. The study was carried out both through literature review (library research) and field research. The authors choose this approach for two reasons.

First, a qualitative approach is more in line with the formulation of research questions. Epistemically, the qualitative approach is built on the constructionist-interpretivism school; believing that meaning and reality are the result of the construction of human thought, and that knowledge is a matter of interpretation (Samiaji, 2012).

Second, referring to the definition given by Mark C. Miller, the new institutionalism combines a traditional approach, which tends to focus on formal institutional structures and rules, with a behavioural approach, which is the dominion of personal actions. In other words, new institutionalism wants to examine the reciprocal relationship between structure and agents in political phenomena (Miller, 2018). In addition, this perspective is also in accordance with the theoretical framework of institutionalisation. This is a theory that views the importance of reciprocal relationships between structures and agents, as well as with other institutions.

### Results and Discussion

To answer the research questions above, this thesis uses Guillermo O'Donnell's theory of institutionalisation. This theory is explained by O'Donnell in two of his writings; *Delegative Democracy* (1994) and *Illusions About Consolidation* (1996) (O'Donnell, 1994, 1996). O'Donnell's institutionalisation theory provides an analytical framework related to two aspects of the institutionalisation process. First, incorporating and spreading shared values (value of infusion) within the institution. Second, actions that become routine (behavioural routinisation). For O'Donnell, institutionalisation is understood as a regular form of social interaction; routines based on mutually agreed values and rules. This view continues the work of several previous scholars. For example, Tsebelis (1990) defines institutionalisation as the process of maturing formal organisational rules. March and Olsen (2010) added that it is not only formal rules involved. Rather, it also includes the values, knowledge, and beliefs of the organisation. Wellhofer (1972) posited that institutionalisation is not much different from bureaucratisation. Janda (1984) defines institutionalisation as organisational stability.

Regarding the two stages contributed by O'Donnell, Levitsky (1998) uses them as a theoretical framework for his research on the institutionalisation of political parties in Argentina. This research is entitled *Institutionalization and Peronism in Argentina*, published in 1988. Levitsky (1998) added that the practice of habituation of action (behavioural routinisation) is divided into two: formal and informal practice. From this explanation, this thesis will use the two stages of O'Donnell's institutionalisation, as stated above.

### **Two Aspects of Guillermo O'Donnell's Theory of Institutionalisation**

In Guillermo O'Donnell's view, institutionalisation has two stages. First, the spread of value (the value of infusion). This is the stage where each member gets and understands the value of the institution, using it to guide their its actions and routines in the organisation and making institutional goals into communal goals. These values are reflected in the AD/ART, regulations, code of ethics and rules of conduct of the institution. This process is the beginning of institutional strengthening. Logically, the movers of institutions or organisations are none other than individuals (agents) who are members and part of the institution. Therefore, the process of institutionalisation will occur if agents have the same values and goals as each other.

The second stage is the behavioural routines carried out by members of the institution. This process occurs when rules and regulations are continuously enforced. Institutional members act in accordance with the rules that have been agreed upon and determined. Therefore, the actions of each member are predictable and orderly. This second stage is a continuation of the first process, where values, norms, and rules can be carried out routinely and continuously by members of the institution. From these two processes, institutionalisation occurs.

This research will use O'Donnell's two institutionalisation processes to examine the application of the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP) in the PKB as part of efforts to prevent political corruption. The infusion stage is the process of accepting SIPP as a shared guide for each member of a political party, both in the elite ranks of the party and members. Meanwhile, the behavioural routinisation stage is the routine of party members when carrying out the Political Party Integrity System, starting from the stages of recruitment, regeneration, or managing the finances of the political party. There are four aspects that are regulated and addressed in SIPP: (1) Produce prospective leaders with integrity; (2) Minimising the risk of political corruption and abuse of power; (3) Become an instrument of compliance with the political party integrity system, and (4) Realising transparent and accountable financial governance.

For more details, the SIPP institutionalisation process will be analysed by taking into account four interlinking aspects: internal, external, structure, and attitudes. The internal/structural aspect include a review of the statutes, bylaws and political party regulations which reflect the implementation of SIPP. In the internal/attitudes aspect includes the attitudes of the party members implementing the statutes, bylaws and party regulations as a reflection of the SIPP. The external/structure aspect includes studies of interactions and relationships between the PKB and the KPK in their efforts to implement SIPP. Meanwhile, the external/attitudes aspect examines how institutions outside the party, including the KPK, support and encourage the institutionalisation of SIPP.

### **Stages of Disseminating Values and Strengthening the Code of Ethics**

Building democratic, open, and accountable political parties is the goal of political parties trying to increase their integrity. One basic way to do so is to obey the code of ethics that has been formulated within the party. The existence of a political party code of ethics is one of the most important things to be considered. In O'Donnell's view, this is included in the value infusion stage. Party officials and members understand and know the values of the party's struggle. The next step is to create a code of ethics which can become a daily guide for party officials and members, including enforcement and sanctions for violators. This stage is called habituation to the practice of values that are known and understood by party officials or members (behavioural routinisation). The political party code of ethics is an instrument of ethical principles that serves as a philosophical or ethical basis for regulating the behavioural and ethical norms of political party

organisations and cadres, both collectively and individually, regarding mandatory, prohibited, appropriate and inappropriate issues.

In the context of the PKB, the distribution of these integrity values can be found in its statutes and bylaws, particularly in the second chapter on the principles of struggle, article 5. This section is continued in the third chapter, which discusses identity, character, and function, as well as in the party tasks and objectives section. It is stated that the principles of the party's struggle are devotion to Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala, upholding truth and honesty, upholding justice, maintaining unity, and fostering brotherhood and togetherness in accordance with Islamic values of people who follow the Sunnah and are in the Jamaah group (Ahlusunnah Waljama'ah) — while the party's objective is to realise a national political order that is democratic, open, clean, and has noble character. This will be done by obtaining political power constitutionally as a means of fighting for and realising the ideals of the proclamation of independence, prosperity and physical and spiritual well-being for all Indonesian people. In Article 9, the PKB has the task of upholding people's sovereignty, realising a democratic, clean and reliable government, carrying out national development for the prosperity of the people, carrying out an independent and active foreign policy and developing foreign cooperation to create lasting, just and prosperous world peace.

“The code of ethics is contained in the proclamation of national independence (Mabda' Siyasi). Mabda' Siyasi is indeed like the preamble in the Constitution. If the contents of the statutes and bylaws can change, the values contained in the PKB may be dynamic according to the progress of the times. Mabda' Siyasi has nine points that cannot be changed, because the basic political pillars of PKB are very clear, which destroys the spirit of the demands of the times, the spirit of reform, and the spirit of accountability, as well as the transparency that the KPK wants.” (Personal interview with Hasanuddin Wahid, online, 15 November 2022)

The statutes and bylaws of the PKB state that party members are prohibited from: (1) Carrying out activities that harm the good name and interests of the party; (2) Engaging in activities that undermine public trust in the party; (3) Obtaining or giving money or other materials from unauthorised persons or goods from within or outside the party for personal gain. This can damage the image and trust of the party, and (4) Carrying out activities that violate the party rules, statutes or bylaws of the Party.

In the management evaluation section, the PKB has tiered provisions. This is regulated in Article 48 of their statutes and bylaws. First, the General Chair evaluates the performance of the Central Executive Board (DPP) functionaries. Second, the DPP periodically evaluates the performance of the Regional Management Council (DPW), Branch Management Council (DPC) and Representative Branch Management Council (DPCP). Third, DPW periodically evaluates the performance of DPAC. Fourth, the DPC periodically evaluates the performance of the Branch Management Council (DPRT). Fifth, the results of the management performance evaluation can be used as a basis for personnel replacement or dismissal from the management of the Party Executive Board.

“In PKB, the rules are clear, namely the existence of a management commitment contract. At the beginning of the management, there is a management commitment contract which is filled out by the legislative leaders and so on. If the administrator is represented by the head of the field, all of that is signed on a stamp duty. If they do not live up to the values of the PKB, then at any time these cadres can be replaced, if proven guilty. The mechanism is to use performance commitments for all administrators. The measure uses it in the PKB. If they violate, they receive punishment.” (Personal interview with Hasanuddin Wahid, online, 15 November 2022)

To oversee the performance of the chairman and also the approval committee (tanfidz), PKB has a deliberative board structure at each level of management. The Shura Council has two duties and powers. First, maintaining the purity of the party's struggle in accordance with the statutes, bylaws, decisions of party deliberative forums and party rules. Second, supervise the implementation of party policies implemented by the Tanfidz Council.

If there are party members who violate party provisions, sanctions will be imposed. The sanctions imposed on party members are: First, a warning, Second, temporary dismissal from party positions and/or positions on behalf of the party, Third, the discharge from party positions

and/or positions on behalf of the party, and Fourth, dismissal or dismissal from party membership.

The determination of sanctions in the form of warnings is carried out by the Party Executive Board at each level through a plenary meeting. While the determination of sanctions in the form of temporary dismissal from office, dismissal from party positions and dismissal of membership is carried out by the DPP on the proposal of the DPW or DPC, for members serving at the central level it is carried out by the DPP only. As conveyed by the Secretary General of the PKB, there is, on average, every year an enforcement of a code of ethics on a party member or members. One form of enforcement is the shifting of positions of one to three DPR members from the PKB as a form of punishment. The same goes for members of other parties.

“So far, several people in the PKB were dismissed when they broke the rules. Every year we usually shift between one, two or three members of the DPR. For those who are bad, we provide punishment according to their mistakes. Where there are sanctions, of course there are levels. Starting from being laid off, then being shifted from a leadership position, even to PAW (overtime shift).” (Personal interview with Hasanuddin Wahid, online, 15 November 2022)

From the explanation above, it can be understood that the stages of value infusion of integrity within the PKB, especially at the level of the code of ethics as outlined in the SIPP, are reflected in the formulation of *Mabda' Siyasi*, statutes and bylaws, the PKB Manifesto, and party regulations. Every new member is obliged to study, know, and embody the code in the party's struggle. In practice, these values are continuously disseminated in party cadre programs. Enforcement and sanctions for administrators or members are also carried out. This is as acknowledged by the Secretary General of PKB above. This practice shows that there are stages of behavioural routinisation of the application of the code of ethics within the PKB internally. However, what has not been found are rules and mechanisms for protecting members or administrators who complain about violations within the PKB (whistle-blowers). Therefore, to fully implement the SIPP, the PKB needs to formulate regulations related to such protection.

### **Strengthening Cadres and Recruitment Levels**

The stage of value infusion related to cadre formation and recruitment in the PKB starts from the formulation of mechanisms contained in the AD/ART and party regulations. From the start, this mechanism is conveyed to new members. Next, this mechanism is routinely and regularly regenerated, from regional to central management levels. In other words, the familiarisation of the regeneration and recruitment guidelines is carried out in stages. In O'Donnell's view, this stage is called behavioural routinisation. Referring to SIPP formulation, a political party cadre system with integrity requires at least four functions: First, regeneration refers to the preparation of political capacity or capability; Second, regeneration is related to the level of the political party or career system that will be built; Third, regeneration is related to how political parties educate their cadres about politics. Politics is not all about the struggle for power. More than that, politics is a vehicle to build a nation and state, and Fourth, regeneration is related to the efforts of political parties to prepare capable cadres who have the capacity to continue the party's vision and mission (SIPP, 2018).

In this context, the PKB also conducts training to improve the ability of its cadres to handle administrative management. In a tiered and structured manner, the PKB routinely conducts administrative training, starting from the central level and extending to the regions through a zoning system (for example, PKB Secretariat Administration Training for the Kalimantan Zone, PKB Zone Administration Training for the Riau, Jambi, and Bengkulu Zones, PKB Secretariat Administration Training for the East Java Zone, and PKB Zone Secretariat Administration Training for Banten, DKI Jakarta, Lampung, and West Java).

Article 8 in the PKB statutes and bylaws states that every party member is obliged to take part in regeneration, education, training and coaching carried out by the party in their territory. Article 9 mentions the rights of each party member. Among them is the right to obtain information on party activities and decisions, as well as to obtain guidance, training, and political education from the party. Members are also entitled to protection and defence from the party.

The mechanism for political education and PKB regeneration is also contained in the articles of association and bylaws chapter XI. There are four elaborations in article 29: First, the party carries out the duties and functions of political education and regeneration; Second, political education is carried out to instil and disseminate the ideology and values of the party's struggle; Third, party regeneration is carried out in an integrated, tiered, and sustainable manner under the control and supervision of the Party's Central Executive Board; and Fourth, further provisions regarding political education and regeneration are regulated in the bylaws of the party.

The ranks of PKB cadres include the Loyalist Cadres, Mobilising Cadres, and Pioneer Cadres. This was also explained by the Secretary General of PKB, Hasanuddin Wahid:

“We have a cadre instructor bank. For example, the DPC must conduct regeneration at least three times. Later, the cadres will rank first, then the DPW cadres will rank second...Until the middle. With this mechanism, the wheels of the organisation can keep running. We first conduct regeneration at the instructor level. All DPC must have a DPC instructor. This year (2022) in East Java there is already a branch level regeneration. It is tiered.” (Personal interview with Hasanuddin Wahid, online, 15 November 2022)

In its implementation, PKB cadre education is carried out in the form of formal and informal activities. For the sake of the political interests of the party, the PKB organises community-based party regeneration and schooling in addition to formal regeneration. Regeneration is an absolute requirement for every party member who wants to get a management promotion, strategic positions in the internal party, a political position or a public position. It is also an integral part of evaluating the performance of the Party Governing Council according to its level. The system, form, curriculum and modules for political education and regeneration are stipulated in the party regulations. The PKB also has a National Cadre Institute. In article 62, it is explained that the National Cadre Institute is tasked with planning, implementing, and evaluating education and training activities for party members and cadres, as well as creating a cadre system, methodology and curriculum.

In accordance with the party's statutes, each cadre is presented with PKB political guidelines. These guidelines are contained in Mabda' Siyasi up to the party decree. In article 33 of the PKB's statutes and bylaws, it is explained that Mabda' Siyasi is a source of values, norms, rules, and principles of party politics. The party statutes are the party's highest basic rules, containing the party's general norms. Party bylaws are rules that contain party organisational norms, further breaking down the party statutes. Party regulations are the implementing regulations stipulated by the DPP on the basis of orders from the statutes and/or bylaws of the party. Meanwhile, DPP decisions are decisions and policies stipulated by the DPP on the basis of orders from higher party rules or in the context of exercising the authority possessed by the general chairman of the party. The basis for this struggle is conveyed to party cadres during recruitment and also in regeneration.

In addition, the PKB also organises the National Political Academy. There are three provisions, as in article 91 of the articles on association and bylaws. First, the National Political Academy was established only at the central level and is managed directly by the DPP; Second, the National Political Academy organises cadre education for candidates for political leaders, candidates for political office, candidates for public office, members of the legislature at all levels, and executive/government officials; and Third, further provisions regarding the National Political Academy are regulated in party regulations.

The requirements to become a member of PKB are as follows. First, membership is open to Indonesian citizens who are 17 years old and/or married; Second, members must be willing to comply with Mabda' Siyasi, statutes, bylaws, party regulations and other party policies and decisions; Third, members must be willing to participate in party activities according to party instructions; Fourth, members must be willing to obey and uphold party discipline; Fifth, members must be willing to declare themselves as a member in writing and submit it to the Party Governing Council or through the Member Admission System prepared by the DPP; Sixth, members must be willing to fulfill the administrative requirements and other requirements determined by the party.

With regards to provisions for recruitment, the PKB adheres to Article 6 AD/ART. First, the party recruits Indonesian citizens to become party members. Second, DPC, DPAC, DPRt and DPART officials are obliged to recruit, collect, and record party membership in their area. Third, data on recruitment and party membership is reported by the DPC to the DPP to be stored, managed, and archived. For the PKB, regeneration is momentum designed to spread and internalise the values of the PKB's struggle. The idea is that from this, a cadre that is militant and loyal will be formed. The hope is that party cadres are not easily trapped by political pragmatism.

General Chairperson of the PKB, Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, assessed that political pragmatism is a dangerous practice that must be prevented by every political actor. According to him, one of the ways to eradicate the danger of political pragmatism is to strengthen ideology. Muhaimin confirmed this while attending virtual PKB Loyalist Cadre Education Class I instructor training (PKP), on Wednesday, January 5, 2021:

“One of the things we have to prepare is a solid party ideology. If all PKB cadres, administrators and strengths are committed to the ideology, loyal to the ideals, and fighting values and morality built by the founders of PKB, then, God willing, we can avoid political pragmatism, and we can even safeguard it so that this PKB can truly become a clean force — pure, and providing an example for the future Indonesian political system.” (Interview with the PKB publication team with Muhaimin Iskandar, 5 January 2021)

Muhaimin also supported the militancy of PKB cadres by cultivating a sense of love and pride in being a part of the PKB. He emphasised that *Mabda' Siyasi PKB* is the main capital that must be firmly invested in every PKB cadre, making PKB's ideology and loyalty a strength in all cadres when realising their goals, objectives, plans and big aspirations, namely to build this nation and state. In the end, the love for PKB must be genuine and not transactional:

“Apart from of course *mabadi khairo ummah*, the foundations for the benefit of the people, the nation and the state that was built by NU and the *maqasidus sharia*. Our aim is to be religious, our goal to apply sharia is very perfect. Therefore, the regeneration that is being intensively carried out by PKB with various preparations, both in terms of instructors at the national and regional levels, materials and also regeneration modules, is one of the strategies to strengthen ideology and loyalty.” (Interview with the PKB publication team with Muhaimin Iskandar, 5 January 2021)

Muhaimin Iskandar also added that the success of regeneration has a close relationship with the success of winning elections. Muhaimin stated that political parties would not win without the best regeneration. This was emphasised by him when opening the PKB Instructor Training on 11 December, 2021, at the Central Jakarta PKB DPP Office, presenting to PKB senior instructors and various experts. The PKB Instructor Training was held for four days from the 11<sup>th</sup> to the 14<sup>th</sup> of December, 2021. Hanif Dhakiri, Deputy Head of the PKB DPP in charge of cadres, and Hasanuddin Wahid, PKB Secretary General of the PKB DPP, were both present at the opening of the training.

According to Muhaimin, cadre formation is the way to create a system of integrity. Every party cadre must have good political knowledge, understand the ideology of their struggle, and have good communication skills with the public. The process of regeneration level must be carried out properly and with full commitment. In addition, every administrator must know and practice the regeneration mechanism that is contained in the bylaws of the PKB. With a clear and definite agenda for cadre formation, cadre militancy in fighting for the goals and dreams of the party can be realised. One such goal is having integrity by staying away from the practice of money politics and political corruption.

The PKB DPP management requires that every PKB cadre must have militancy and high aspirations. Their ideology is surmised as “*Dare to have a dream to serve and bring benefit to the motherland*”. This “dream” is then turned into in the guiding motivation of every regeneration. Making ideology a movement, ethos, and behaviour that can be accepted by people from all walks of life is a big responsibility for every PKB instructor. In addition, Muhaimin advised all PKB cadre instructors to master mass cadre techniques and produce optimal results. He said this step had to be taken in order to quickly and effectively recruit new PKB cadres in large numbers in each region.



“Nahdlatul Ulama's dream is big, Indonesia's dream is glorious, even the dream of becoming President can become an ideology. This must be firmly instilled in our hearts, in our every move and struggle. And there I think our task is to produce as many instructors as possible, per village there must be instructors who become references for the implementation of regeneration. So please make it massive and fast, because we are chasing time. Instructors have the job of creating instructors. Instructors train successfully. Let's create this network quickly and massively at all levels of our party.” (Interview with the PKB publication team with Muhaimin Iskandar, 14 December 2021)

The regeneration stages carried out by PKB above still leaves room for some improvement agendas. First, in terms of consistency and continuity, regeneration is a process that requires follow-up and assistance. When political parties enter an election year, the regeneration agenda becomes the second agenda. In an election year, political parties are preoccupied with several other things, such as recruiting members for candidacy, socialising general chairmen of political parties to become presidential candidates, fighting for presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and conflicts of political interests within their party. This occurs in all political parties.

Second, there must be consistency within the PKB DPP in forming militant cadres and promoting structural positions and candidacy in elections, legislative elections, and regional elections. Parties sometimes prefer candidates from outside or non-cadres for reasons of popularity and political capital. This fact leaves the cadres feeling disappointed. As a consequence, the party's programs, which require loyal internal cadres, is not optimal.

### **Practicing and Strengthening Internal Democracy**

Before becoming part of the wider Indonesian democracy, the PKB was aware that democracy needed to be practiced within the party itself. Because of this, the statutes, budgets and party regulations have mechanisms for strengthening internal democracy. These mechanisms include the rights and obligations of members, the forms of member involvement in deliberations and meetings, and the opportunity to occupy structural positions. These mechanisms are always socialised and practiced in the PKB. It is at this point that the infusion and behavioural routinisation values as in O'Donnell's theory can be identified. In addition, in the SIPP formulation, it is stated that internal democratic institutions require the participation of all members, cadres and political party officials in deliberations or meetings that plan periodic management changes in accordance with political party regulations. In the end, cadres who are familiar with democratic values can contribute to true democracy, produce honest state administrators, and achieve clean and effective governance. (SIPP, 2018).

There are four indicators of internal election implementation. First, political parties being accustomed to the democratic decision-making processes, such as selecting alliance partners and selecting leaders and/or general chairpersons of political parties. Apart from that, they also select regional administrators and/or branches of political parties at the regency/city level. Second, political parties provide an equal open door to all cadres to become candidates for public office. This is based on each achievement, track record, and capacity. Third, personal leadership style is no longer institutionalised by political parties. Fourth, the decentralisation of authority is given to regional level administrators; namely the authority to independently decide on policies at the local level without central interference. The aim is to reduce the roaming power of the central council by asking for political or other dowries.

The PKB Manifesto mentions a strategic program for the next five years. One aspect is the strengthening of internal democracy. The details include making the party's grand design and formulating the operationalisation of the party's ideology. This manifesto serves as a strategic guideline for long-term party officials, consisting of philosophical operationalisation, institutional plans, regeneration, program plans, administrative systems, strengthening internal democracy, and winning elections. In addition, the PKB also carried out the revitalisation of its political cadres. The aim was to ensure that party regeneration was carried out consistently and in accordance with a meritocratic system. The goal was to make it so that in the future, the regeneration system could run in a structured, efficient, and measurable manner according to the dynamics of the times. In this context, cadre formation is a series of processes that includes the recruitment of

cadres, coaching, mentoring, education and development up to the promotion and distribution of cadres. Everything must reflect values that respect democratic principles.

Another strategic program is ensuring the relationship between the PKB party and the cadre and mass bases. This is done by strengthening and expanding the base network and strategic groups, strengthening political recruitment systems, developing campaign management, strengthening foreign networks and international roles, strengthening advocacy politics, strengthening autonomous bodies, and forming party tactical organs. The PKB must be ready to become a modern, professional party where all administrators and members have the same responsibility and are democratically involved in all party formulation and decision-making processes.

“The second thing that is done in internal democracy is the recruitment of candidates. We make open recruitment on our website. Anyone who wants to enter is allowed. The most important thing is that they want to follow regeneration and all existing party mechanisms. Everyone has a chance.” (Personal interview with Hasanuddin Wahid, online, 15 November 2022)

Internal party democracy is a mechanism run by the PKB to manage the dynamics of the aspirations and the interests of the various cadres. PKB's internal democratisation is outlined in the AD/ART. The aim is that no one faction or group dominates and that every member knows the mechanisms of the party, both in efforts to resolve conflicts and in determining cadres as caleg candidates. In his statement, Nurkholim Billy Ariez, as the PKB DPP Information Management and Documentation Officer (PPID) acknowledged this:

“In the past, PKB focused on personnel. For now, PKB has created a system focused on parties with rules of the game, so that the cadres can know and trust the party. Those are the most important points because problems can be brought directly to the constitution. For example, in the candidacy, there is a public test that will be asked of them later, not only about the questions that were built, but also about the budget and things that are prioritised. By the way they present, they can provide strong evidence and the right reasons why cadres can be recommended and not.” (Personal interview with Nurkholim Billy Ariez, Online, 2 January 2023)

However, there are a number of ways also in which the PKB does not prioritise a ‘one man one vote’ system. For example, when selecting the names of candidates for chairman of the DPW and DPC, each branch proposes five candidates. The DPC then explores the options, sets a chairman and fills the ranks of the board through a branch meeting (Muscab). The same system also elects a general chairman in the Muktamar event, engaging voices from DPW and DPC, as stated by Hasanuddin Wahid:

“Regarding internal democracy, each party has its own rules. As for the PKB, it can be found in the statutes and bylaws. For example, regarding recruitment, it is done from the bottom. They propose names to be recruited. Democracy is not then ‘one man one vote’. For example, if we elect the chairman of the DPC, the branch committee will propose five names, submitted to DPW and DPP for selection. When elected, the Muscab will be equipped with its management. While the name of the chairman was taken from the five names proposed earlier, the rest in Muscab complete the management. The climax is when the general chairman is at the top of the congress, elected by the DPC and DPW.” (Personal interview with Hasanuddin Wahid, online, 15 November 2022)

On top of these internal elective policies, PKB's internal democracy is reflected in the practice of deliberations and meetings. Party policies and issues are discussed with the board according to their level. All members have the same rights and obligations to express opinions or be involved in decision making. In the PKB structure, according to the articles of association and bylaws article 27, there are 15 types of party deliberations. The central level consists of a large meeting of organisational representatives (Muktamar), a national working meeting (Munas), and a National Leadership Conference. This is then followed by Regional Conferences, Regional Work Conferences and Regional Leaders Conferences. At the regency/city level, there are Branch Conferences, Branch Work Conferences, and Branch Leadership Conferences. At the sub-district

level, there are sub-branch meetings and sub-branch work meetings. In addition, there are four types of meetings used by PKB, including Plenary Meetings, Joint Meetings, Daily Management Meetings, and other meetings deemed necessary. All of this is done in an attempt to strengthen internal democracy.

“Decisions are always made through meetings, plenary meetings, daily meetings and so on. The mechanism of meetings include discussions and deliberations. Everyone has the same rights and obligations. This is a form of internal democracy habituation.” (Personal interview with Hasanuddin Wahid, online, 15 November 2022)

### **Improvement and Disclosure of Financial Governance**

PKB's financial management strategy can be seen from two stages, value infusion and behavioural routinisation of integrity values. The first stage takes place in the form of party financial governance mechanisms laid out in the statutes, bylaws, and party regulations relating to sources, budgeting, allocation, and reporting. The principles and values that underlie this mechanism are honesty, accountability, and responsibility. This guideline is disseminated to all PKB administrators and members. In addition, there is regular monitoring and evaluation, for example for funding which originated from the APBN, an audit was conducted by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) of the Republic of Indonesia.

One way to eradicate party oligarchy is to allocate a proper state budget for political parties. This funding is not meant to be a "blank check", given without intention or precondition.. Budget allocations, of course, only make sense when coupled with accountability and transparency. Strengthening these two things is absolutely necessary, as is improving the system of regeneration, recruitment, and code of ethics in internal party affairs.

Referring to SIPP formulation, there are five things that form the core of political party financial management. First, the process by which political parties build a financial system that is open, accountable, and accessible to the general public. This is in accordance with Law Number 2 of 2011 which mandates political parties openly disclose information about themselves, including their finances. The financial system, alongside a modern management system, will determine whether an organisation is healthy or not. Sound and transparent financial governance must be owned by political parties. The goal is to remove the dependence of political parties on a single source of income or individual capital owners. The public need to have the right to access financial reports at any time. For this reason, political parties must have regulations that require administrators at all levels, both central and regional, to make transparent financial reports.

Second, the 2015 KPK Study showed that political party assistance funds from the state budget are expected to be used for recruitment and regeneration, formulating and enforcing the political party's code of ethics, providing political education for the general public, and strengthening party financial management. Thus, funding assistance from the state must be accountable to the public as the State Budget sources its funds from tax money withdrawn from the people.

Third, parties must have oversight of the use of party funds in order to prevent misuse by individuals or party elites. This way, the party can remain independent, rather than beholden to a small group of individuals. Dependence on one/few individual or corporate donors means that wealthy capital owners can easily offer financing and coerce the party. Therefore, cadres, administrators and party leaders must share financial responsibility. In other words, the allocation of party funds requires an internal monitoring mechanism.

Fourth, there needs to be joint guidance regarding procedures for using party funds. There must be an obligation to record all party activities which includes incomes and amounts. These records should then be reported to the public on a regular basis. The reason for this is that political parties are public legal entities and are therefore bound by state mechanisms and legislation.

Fifth, party financial management must prioritise the principle of independence. With this principle, the party will be stronger and not easily controlled by capital owners. This allows the party to be collectively owned, rather than belonging to just a few people. With independence, the party actions are not easily intervened in by outsiders, especially entrepreneurs who want to protect their economic interests through the political meddling.

In the PKB statutes and bylaws, party finances come from five sources Article 30 states that party finances and assets come from: (1) Membership dues; (2) State aid; (3) Efforts made by the party; (4) Donations that are legal and lawful and not binding, and (5) The transfer of rights for and on behalf of the party.

The PKB issued Party Regulation Number 5 of 2020 regarding the contribution of its party members. One acknowledgement published was the need for accountable, transparent and independent financing. In this acknowledgement was the implication that party members are obliged to contribute to the party financially.

There are seven types of party member contributions: entry fees, membership fees, monthly payments, solemn funds, sanction fees, zakat infaq alms (ZIS), and incidental donations. The principles of collecting, managing, and allocating member contribution money are meant to be carried out in an obedient, orderly, effective, accountable, and structured manner based on feasibility, fairness, and appropriateness. Each contribution must be reported annually to the DPP in full detail. During recruitment, the financial governance contained in the statutes, bylaws and party regulations are disseminated to new members. Member compliance with fees is part of their obligation to the party, seen as a form of loyalty to the party struggle. In practice, this system is run by administrators at the central to regional levels.

In the PKB statutes and bylaws it is explained that the membership fees are divided for the operation of three levels of management. First, the DPP PKB gets 10 percent. Second, the DPW or Regional Management Council at the provincial level gets 20 percent. Third, the DPC or district/city level branch managers receive 70 percent. The DPP, DPW and DPC all receive financial assistance sourced from the APBN/Regional Revenue Expenditure Budget (APBD) and must prepare and submit accountability reports at their respective levels. Several types of donation by party members are required for members at central, provincial or district level who occupy political or public positions including members of the legislature, legislative leaders, heads of the fittings of the council, heads of factions, and executive position holders.

To strengthen the above financial governance, the PKB was one of the parties (which participated in the 2019 Election) which have been in intense communication with the KPK. A few months after the election, after the commitment to SIPP was signed by party leaders, the KPK visited the PKB DPP office. This visit was well received by the board of the DPP PKB, among them General Treasurer Eko Putro Sandjojo, Deputy Treasurer Bambang Susanto, and PKB Deputy Secretary General Hasanuddin Wahid. The meeting took place at the PKB DPP Office on March 12, 2019. The aim was to communicate further regarding the implementation of SIPP with regards to financial governance.

State assistance to political party finances is part of strengthening the regeneration system, the goal being the facilitation of the nation's children to compete equally. If political contestation costs a lot, it indirectly eliminates children who do not have financial capital.

“The reality of the current political system is many of the nation's children have the potential to lead, but do not dare to enter politics. I was offered to be regent 20 years ago, but I refused. Because I know very well that the systems in it are very dirty. I could have accepted it had the system been clean. But because the system is dirty, of course, a lot of money needs to be spent.” (Personal interview with Wariki Sutikno, online, 5 November 2022)

If the costs of regeneration of political parties and their administrative needs are not assisted by the state, then political parties will easily fall into the hands of oligarchs. Neither the party officials nor their staff will be independent, instead they will be controlled by the owners of capital. This fact, of course, is not healthy for a democratic climate. Political parties, channels for the aspirations of the people's voice, instead become channels for the interests of investors. If this is allowed to occur, the party inevitably becomes a tool to return capital to its donors.

“Being a president or a figure sometimes has to go through the payment stage. At present there are many practices of political dealers. If there are three candidates, it is possible that all three are funded by the same Bandar, until then one of them is herded not to be elected. Of course, it is still profitable business for the dealers.” (Personal interview with Wariki Sutikno, online, 5 November 2022)

The addition of party financing assistance must be included in the revision of the Political Party Law. Political parties themselves must also improve using state aid as a regeneration resource to form cadres of future nation leaders. These leaders must be managed according to the principle of meritocracy based on their potential and achievements rather than on family or lineage. This is also the case in reporting and auditing; state money must be used to sow a cadre of leaders without burdening cadres or party officials seeking income and party financing, who often succumb to corruption. Financial aid for political parties is one way to create a political system with integrity.

“I am very committed to continuing to create a political system, especially the funding of the political party system. This is related to efforts to prevent corruption and so on. One of them must be a revision of the law in elections and political parties. I do this because I have great hope that the nation's children who have the potential to lead won't have to pay costs like this. I also hope to change the mentality of society to not always be pragmatic.” (Personal interview with Wariki Sutikno, online, 5 November 2022)

In addition to providing additional party finances, management must also be improved. Implementation of the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP) is one of the steps that must be followed up, starting with strengthening the code of ethics, regeneration and recruitment, internal democracy, and improved party financial management. Financial assistance is one form of government concern. Using public money will improve the political system. Because of a good political system, statesmen will be born, rather than party cadres who are endlessly involved in political corruption.

“So I think we have to fix the system. Among other things, this arrangement of political costs, of course, cannot be given away without accountability. Therefore, the SIPP system is indeed a solution. The logic is yes, if the party is controlled by interests or owners of capital, they will definitely benefit the owner of that model. This is not ideal in political theory. In my opinion there are four points that must be changed for the better: First, the law must be changed. Second, cost arrangements must be made. Third, we must strengthen the institutional capacity strengthening system, including supervision. Fourth, we must conduct political education for the people.” (Personal interview with Wariki Sutikno, online, 5 November 2022)

In the context of the PKB, financial assistance from political parties by the state is very important. The presence of the state provides a budget for party regeneration and management to be one of the real efforts in preventing political corruption. The government needs to ensure the party's commitment through financial usage reports and the regeneration of the younger generation. Assistance from the state can reduce the temptation for party cadres to engage in political corruption.

The PKB understands that the amount of party financial assistance from the government is adjusted to the strength of the APBN. Far more important is the existence of state support for the modernisation of political parties. It is impossible to have a quality democracy without a quality party. Party financial assistance from the state can be used for regeneration with the party being able to remain independent. In addition, it is necessary to avoid a high-cost political system. Creating an affordable political system, where politicians cannot waste money, is vital.

“In fact, the most important thing is that what is given by the state is appropriate to reform the party and make the party an important element of the needs of democracy and this country. Therefore, the budget should be adjusted according to the available APBN. Besides that, these political parties will be more modern, enthusiastic, and will make society prosperous in a more modern way. Because with support from the government, it certainly helps. But no matter how much you give, it's definitely not enough, because it (the cost) ends up being abysmal due to lots of activities. But at least the government can provide support for regeneration fields and administration offices. The rest we will find ourselves. Because party members are not allowed to sleep, taking care of things ranging from natural disasters to individual disasters. Therefore, the measure is simple: the minimum support provided is so that this party has the power to make itself a friendly institution, because democracy without parties is impossible.” (Personal interview with Hasanuddin Wahid, online, 15 November 2022).

## Conclusion

From the discussion above, three things can be concluded. First, the institutionalisation of the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP) in the PKB, within the framework of O'Donnell's institutionalisation theory, took place in two stages. The first was the value infusion contained in the SIPP. This distribution was through Mabda' Siyasi, statutes and bylaws, the PKB Manifesto, and party regulations. It regulated the code of ethics, regeneration and recruitment, internal democratisation, and financial governance. Second, the PKB's internal provisions serve as a reference for carrying out party activities. In O'Donnell's view, this is called the routinisation of the application of values (behavioural routinization), formulated in the Mabda' Siyasi, statutes and bylaws, the PKB Manifesto, and party regulations regarding the enforcing the code of ethics, regeneration and recruitment, internal democratisation, and financial governance.

Second, there are achievements and challenges to the institutionalisation of the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP) in the PKB. For political parties, there is a shared desire to make the party have integrity. Party cadres and officials are aware that the party is central to democracy. The improvement of integrity requires awareness and concrete steps by all involved, including the political elite. The problem of political liberalisation, which correlates with the high cost of political contestation, is one of the critical points that becomes a common challenge for all parties. But not many can agree on the point at which the improvements were made. One thing that has benefited parties is the addition of state aid funds. The practice has gone up 10 times. This has allowed political parties, including the PKB, feel cared for by the state, especially in their regeneration and administration efforts. Therefore, this step needs to be continuously supported and supervised.

Third, the response of PKB management to efforts to institutionalise the Political Party Integrity System (SIPP) tended to be good. Even by the general secretary of the DPP PKB management, SIPP is seen as part of accelerating the modernisation of political parties, including PKB. Basically, each party already has values and guidelines as stated in the SIPP, as well as its own terms and culture, including the KPK, the media, and civil society, must continue to collaborate to improve the integrity of political parties. One improvement is the implementation of SIPP, because all parties agree that political corruption is a common threat.

From the conclusions of the research above, three recommendations can be put forward. First, the KPK and political parties must continue to maximize the implementation of SIPP and communicate to carry out joint evaluations. The achievements of the last few years, although not much, are a good first step, particularly joint concern thinking about the right formula for party financing. With hope, political parties do not fall into the hands of investors or oligarchs. By maximising the application of SIPP, party integrity can be expected to experience improvement.

Second, the institutionalisation of the SIPP needs to pay attention to the structure and culture that has been built by each party. As a formula and guide, the SIPP appears as a general and uniform improvement offer. In practice, each party has different values and culture when managing their party, including their own efforts to improve integrity, starting from strengthening and enforcing their code of ethics, regeneration and recruitment, internal democratisation, and financial governance. In order for SIPP to not misunderstood as part of reduction in the number of political parties, a dialogical and continuous implementation approach is needed between the KPK and the party.

Third, improving the integrity of political parties through the implementation of SIPP needs to be supported by the use of technology and digitalisation. Every political party must be encouraged to be proficient in using technology and digital mediums for managing party membership databases, implementing work programs, public information, and reporting on financial governance. Party accountability not only makes people more trusting, but also increases member loyalty. However, it must be remembered that in general, technological prowess is not evenly distributed. There are some areas that are still lagging behind. Therefore, it is necessary to step together, party officials and the government side by side.

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